Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49 by Kamp, Allen R.
SMU Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 2 Article 3
1998
Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform
Commercial Code: 1940-49
Allen R. Kamp
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. Rev. 275 (1998)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol51/iss2/3
UPTOWN ACT: A HISTORY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1940-49
Allen R. Kamp*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. UPTOWN/DOWNTOWN ................................. 276
II. THE FOUR PARAMETERS AND LLEWELLYN'S
GOALS FOR COMMERCIAL LAW ..................... 281
III. THE 1940-41 DRAFTS ................................... 290
A . TRADE NORMS ........................................ 290
B. LEGISLATIVE DICTATE ................................ 294
C. THE REGULATORY MODEL ............................ 295
D. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT .............................. 299
E. THE PROBLEM OF THE STANDARDIZED CONTRACT
AND THE FIRST DRAFTS ............................... 299
1. The Problem ...................................... 299
2. Section 1-C of the 1941 Draft ...................... 301
IV. THE MODERNIZATION OF CONTRACT
DOCTRINE ....... ............................. 302
V. YOU MIGHT USE "UNCONSCIONABLE"-
REGULATION OF FORM CONTRACTS STARTS
TURNING INTO UNCONSCIONABILITY .............. 306
A. "UNCONSCIONABILITY" ENTERS SALES DISCOURSE .... 306
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY: THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE .... 308
VI. THE 1944 DRAFT ....................................... 313
A. THE DRAFTING PROCESS .............................. 313
B. THE 1944 D RAFT ...................................... 316
VII. COMMERCIAL PAPER AND SECURED
TRANSACTIONS ........................................ 322
VIII. THE GENERAL COMMENT ............................ 325
A . D ESCRIPTION .......................................... 325
B. THE GENERAL COMMENT AND ECONOMICS ........... 330
IX . 1946-1948 ................................................. 332
A. REGULATION OF SECURED LENDING: THE TENTATIVE
PROPOSALS ............................................ 332
B. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY CLAUSE .................... 334
X. THE 1949 DRAFTS ..................................... 336
A. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE GENERAL COMMENT ... 338
B. THE FOUR PARAMETERS .............................. 340
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.
SMU LAW REVIEW
1. Sales .............................................. 341
2. Secured Transactions .............................. 342
3. The Late 1949 Drafts .............................. 344
C. THE CODE GOES DOWNTOWN ......................... 346
I. UPTOWN/DOWNTOWNMY title is inspired by a footnote in Professor John Henry Schle-
gel's The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, where he notes that
there are intellectual as well as geographical neighborhoods.
"[Tlhe world is divided into many little neighborhoods. Woe is it to any-
one who tries to talk 85th Street to the dudes on 107th."
1
One can conceptualize the history of the drafting of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.) as the story of what happened when the proposed
statute left Morningside Heights, the neighborhood of Columbia Univer-
sity, and the legal realists, anthropologists, and institutional economists
working there, and went downtown to mid-town Manhattan and Wall
Street to meet with private commercial attorneys, businessmen, and
bankers. One can imagine Karl Llewellyn, professor of law at Columbia,
putting his proposals for a Revised Sales Act in his briefcase and taking
the Number One IRT downtown to hammer out the Code provisions.2
This visualization differs from the generally accepted history of the
U.C.C. That history reads as follows: The Code was a product of the
work of two institutions, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCC) and the American Law Institute (ALI). The
NCC had promulgated about seven uniform commercial acts, while the
ALI's main product was the Restatements of the Law.3
"The creation of the Uniform Commercial Code represents one phase
in the history of the struggles of various national organizations with the
intractable problems of unification, simplification and modernization of
law in the United States."'4
The NCC proposed to prepare "a great uniform commercial code," and
in response, Llewellyn proposed to an NCC conference a First Draft and
1. John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435,
453 n.50 (1989) (book review) (quoting Arthur Jacobson in a personal conversation).
2. See REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1941), re-
printed in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 269 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed. 1984) [here-
inafter R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft].
3. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-76
(1973). John Henry Schlegel describes the ALI: "That organization provided now tax de-
ductible opportunities for slightly left of center, upper-caste lawyers to socialize in an at-
mosphere that reinforced the notion that theirs was a learned profession and thus further
separated them from the stench of the Untermenschen of the profession." JOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 212 (1995)
[hereinafter SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM]. For a different view of the ALI,
which describes it as a force for positive change in the law, see N.E.H. Hull, Restatement
and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 J.L. HIST.
REV. 55 (1990).
4. TWINING, supra note 3, at 276-77.
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Report on a Revised Uniform Sales Act. He then prepared another re-
port containing a critique of the Uniform Sales Act and a complete new
draft. At a 1941 meeting, the NCC and ALl entered into negotiations
over drafting a uniform commercial code and the ALI chose Llewellyn as
the chief reporter with Soia Mentschikoff as the Assistant Chief. A
"treaty" between the ALI and the NCC was concluded in 1944, and the
drafting process, with many stages of revision and consultation, began.5
"After the publication of the first complete draft in May 1949 ... memo-
randa and reports were received from Bar Associations, law firms, official
committees set up in various states, and commercial and business con-
cerns .... ",6 The Code was adopted in 1953 in Pennsylvania, but its pas-
sage was postponed in New York until after a monumental study by the
New York Law Revision Commission. The Code's drafters made various
changes in response to the New York Commission's criticism, which re-
sulted in the 1957 Official Draft. Between that draft's publication and
1966, forty-eight jurisdictions enacted the Code.7
The rest, as they say, is history. Recently, however, even that history is
being ignored. A recent article in the ABA Journal speaks of Article 2
being "drafted in the 1950s. '' 8 The Code, however, was first proposed in
the 1940s, and it resembles many other statutes that date back to the New
Deal era. "It was the curious fate of the Code, a 1940s statute, not to
have been widely enacted until the 1960s." 9 The latest edition of the
standard commercial law treatise, White and Sumners's Uniform Com-
mercial Code,10 has dropped the sections that discussed the Code's his-
tory. The treatise presents the reader with a statute that just exists.
By looking at the record somewhat differently, the story changes from
a long drafting process conducted by two remote, august, and expert insti-
tutions into one characterized by a collision between the two cultures of
Uptown and Downtown. It is an epic in which a radical professor-a fan
of folk music, a poet, a supporter of the New Deal, a devotee of anthro-
pologists and Veblen and Commons, the radical institutional economists,
a despiser of pallid intellectuals who instead preferred "action-direction
thinking," and a decorated veteran of the German Army of World War I
who was about to divorce his second wife and marry one of his former
students'"'-sought to realize his radical, reformist programs for sales law.
He, his third wife, and his hand-picked group of young professors1 2 pro-
5. See id. at 279-86.
6. Id. at 286-87.
7. See id. at 287-98.
8. See Henry J. Reske, Software Publishers Take Interest in U.C.C., A.B.A. J., July
1995, at 22.
9. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 86 (1977) [hereinafter GILMORE,
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW].
10. See 1-4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMNERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(4th ed. 1995).
11. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 87-127.
12. Llewellyn handpicked a number of young academics, "promising young men near
the start of their careers," to work on the Code. Id. at 284.
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posed such radical changes in commercial law as strict liability in tort,
fact-finding by a merchants jury, pervasive regulation of the formation
and performance of contracts, truth-in-lending disclosures, abolishment
of holder-in-due course in secured consumer lending, and notice before
self-help repossession. Although Llewellyn presented his ideas as tradi-
tional, they were revolutionary in practice. 13
These ideas were proposed years before they were finally enacted into
law. Some of them never have been. These radical reforms, however,
were gradually limited or discarded in the drafting process. Choosing be-
tween having their proposed code being a purely academic exercise or
having it adopted by state legislators, the drafters chose the latter and de-
radicalized the U.C.C.14
13. "Llewellyn was willing to characterize his work as nonradical in introduction, and
yet to be radical in proposal." Richard L. Barnes, Toward a Normative Framework for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 125 n.24 (1989).
14. N.E.H. Hull describes Llewellyn's romanticism in The Romantic Realist: Art,
Literature and the Enduring Legacy of Karl Llewellyn's Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J.L. HIST.
115 (1996). For Llewellyn's radical manifesto of legal realism, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); for
his interest in folk music, see Karl N. Llewellyn, unpublished and untitled manuscript on
Folksong (on file with SMU Law Review) [hereinafter Llewellyn, unpublished manuscript].
He supported FDR's court-packing plan, see Karl N. Llewellyn, A United Front on the
Court, 144 THE NATION 288, 289 (1937) [hereinafter Llewellyn, United Front]; his relations
with anthropology and anthropologists is described by the co-author of THE CHEYENNE
WAY, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CON-
FLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941) [hereinafter THE CHEYENNE
WAY], and E. Adamson Hoebel, Karl Llewellyn: Anthropological Jurisprude, 18 RUTGERS
L. REV. 735 (1964) [hereinafter Hoebel, Anthropoligical Jurisprude]. Llewellyn com-
mented on Commons's work in Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon
Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665, 665 n.1 (1925) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Effect], and
there acknowledged his indebtedness to Veblen and Commons, see id.; for Llewellyn's de-
spising of intellectualism "Your physique and mentality turn soft and gooy [sic]" and his
preference for "Action directive thinking is an orderly projection of the imagination into
the future, with strict adherence to the facts of experience," see Karl N. Llewellyn, Our
Present Intellectualism, microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers B.V.3.u. (on file with
SMU Law Review); for his service in the German army, see TWINING, supra note 3, at 479-
81; for his divorce and remarriage, see id. at 109-10. Grant Gilmore expressed doubts on
the validity of laissez-faire. See Grant Gilmore, On The Difficulties of Codifying Commer-
cial Law, 57 YALE L. REV. 1341, 1358 (1948) [hereinafter Gilmore, Difficulties]. Llewellyn
had a free hand in picking the Reporters of the Code articles. See TWINING, supra note 3,
at 284. The proposed drafts of the U.C.C. at one time or another contained provisions for
strict liability for manufactured goods. See The Code of Commercial Law (1948), reprinted
in 5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFrS 213 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984) [hereinafter
Code of Commercial Law]; merchant juries, see R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 59-
59D, at 531-37; regulation of form contracts, see id. at 331-32; a proto truth-in-lending
disclosure, see Uniform Commercial Code § 9-205 (Proposed Final Draft 1950), reprinted
in 11 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 234-36 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984); holder-
in-due course in consumer secured lending prohibitions, see Uniform Commercial Code§ 8-207 (October 1949 Revisions of § 1-105, Bank Collections Part of Art. 3 § 6-303, and
Articles on Secured Transactions and Bulk Transfers), reprinted in 8 UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE DRAFTS 403, 496-97 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984); notice before self-help re-
possession was required, see Uniform Commercial Code § 8-608 (September 1949
Revisions of § 1-105, § 6-603 and Articles on Secured Transactions), reprinted in 8 UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 265, 378 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984); and an objec-
tive good faith requirement for holders-in-due course. See Commercial Code §§ 43, 45
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 1947), reprinted in 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 45, 78
(Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
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This Article discusses the history of the Code, from the 1940 drafting of
the Revised Uniform Sales Act to the 1949 drafts of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The year 1949 is a logical stopping point because the drafts
of that year represented the drafters' best efforts before the commercial
world woke up, took it seriously, and started the lobbying and other polit-
ical processes in earnest to protect and to improve their interests.
Another reason for drawing the line around 1949 is that it was near
that time when the cast of characters who were drafting the Code
changed. Karl Llewellyn withdrew, at least partially, from the drafting
process.15 Hiram Thomas, a spokesman and lawyer for the New York
Merchant's Association who served as the voice of the practical commer-
cial lawyer, became too ill to participate in the drafting process. 16 The
original drafters of the early 1940s were supplemented by such persons as
Grant Gilmore and Allison Dunham, who as of 1946 worked on the se-
cured transactions article, and Charles Bunn, a professor at Wisconsin
who edited the Code from 1951-52.17 Another type of drafter emerged,
acting as a liaison with particular interests. Walter Malcolm worked with
the banking industry,' 8 Homer Kripke with the financing industry,19 and
F.T. Dierson with the food, drug, and cosmetics industry. 20 A new group
came in and took the Code from its proposed version of 1949 to the one
that was enacted.
Thus, the U.C.C. as it exists today, is a product of compromise between
the original reformist program and the political reality of the forties and
fifties. It still bears the impact of the collision between Morningside
Heights and Wall Street.21 This Article provides a broad-brush descrip-
15. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 286.
16. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 520 (1987); Letter from Hiram Thomas to Her-
bert F. Goodrich, ALI Archives (Apr. 29, 1948) (on file with SMU Law Review). Hiram
Thomas's contribution to the U.C.C. was significant, but it is now ignored. It was he who
introduced unconscionability into Article 2. See discussion, infra notes 180-219 and accom-
panying text.
17. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 271.
18. See Walter D. Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle with Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REV.
265 n.* (a biographical sketch of Mr. Malcolm).
19. See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY at xi (1965)
[hereinafter GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS].
20. See Letter from F.T. Dierson to John W. MacDonald, ALI Archives (June 21,
1954) (on file with SMU Law Review).
21. Grant Gilmore describes the Code in these terms, as an unsatisfactory
compromise:
The Code in its final form can best be described as a compromise solution
which satisfied no one. Llewellyn had recruited a drafting staff which was
composed mostly of younger law professors whose own ideas about law had
been greatly influenced by Llewellyn and the other Realists. Sharing Llewel-
lyn's views, they produced drafts which reflected his own pluralism and anti-
conceptualism. Those drafts were largely rewritten by practitioners whose
instinctive approach to law was more conventional. Even so, the Code, as
rewritten, retained more than mere traces of the earlier approach, both in
substance and in style. It testifies to the fundamental cleavage which, by the
1940s, had overtaken the legal profession in this country.
GILMORE, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 9, at 85-86.
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tion of this process of compromise, rather than the typical micro-analysis
of the history of one section.
Writing or reading a history of the U.C.C. may seem to be one of the
most boring exercises in which one could indulge. But there are reasons
for studying the Code's history. Perhaps the most important reason is
that its history reveals that the U.C.C. is not a sacred text, not a distilla-
tion by experts of the wisdom of commercial law. It is just a statute, and
like all other legislation, it is a product of the problems of its time, the
social and economic presuppositions of its era, and the relative power of
the political forces involved. The drafters took various positions on sev-
eral commercial issues and, so can we today. For example, Article 9's
allowance of self-help repossession without notice did not come directly
from the common law, but was debated in the drafting process. In its first
drafts, the secured transactions article required notice before reposses-
sion. The issue is debatable, and we can reconsider the issue today.
Moreover, studying the history of the Code helps our understanding of
various problems of interpreting the Code. Many anomalies in the Code
can only be explained by its history. For example, in Article 2, good faith
is objective, but in Article 1, it is subjective.22 Even though the effect on
the rights of the buyer is practically the same, there are different stan-
dards of performance for single delivery and installment contracts. Such
anomalies are products of the Code's historical development and the
compromises made. For example, the standard of performance of a con-
tract is the result of a compromise between Llewellyn's proposals for a
standard of mercantile performance and the desire of others to retain the
strict performance standard of commercial law.
Some U.C.C. rules are neither anomalous nor unresolved but are just
vague in meaning. Examples are unconscionability and the many "rea-
sonable" and "commercially reasonable" standards scattered throughout
Article 2. However, these vague concepts originally had an objective
meaning and were to be applied by merchants themselves. Much of the
present Code's ambiguity is the result of the rejection of Llewellyn's pro-
cedures to determine reasonableness (the merchant tribunals) and the de-
letion of his Comments that explained what "reasonable" meant.
Political compromise also produced many of the U.C.C.'s more compli-
cated sections. For example, the sections on varying statutory provisions
by agreement, sections 1-102(3) and (4), are the result of a long fight on
whether the Code's dictates should be mandatory or not. The complex
relation between course of dealing, usage of trade, course of perform-
ance, and express terms of an agreement is again the result of a compro-
mise between Llewellyn's program to have commercial law based on
trade norms and others' desire to base it on individual contracting.
Looking beyond the Code, we can see that the interaction between
other laws and the Code is problematic. Examples are the relationship of
22. See U.C.C. § 2-103 (1989) ("observance of reasonable commercial standards.., in
the trade"); U.C.C. § 1-201(19) ("honesty in fact").
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402A liability in tort with warranty liability under Article 2 and that be-
tween federal consumer protection legislation and the Code. Originally,
however, the Code itself contained products liability and consumer pro-
tection sections. The Code originally provided a more integrated ap-
proach than it does in its current version. As a result, a study of the
Code's history is essential in understanding what commercial law is today.
But perhaps the best reason for researching, writing, and studying the
Code's history is that it is actually an interesting story, containing a hang-
ing judge, an aristocratic wastrel who was an ancestor of Princess Diana,
The Duchess of Marlborough, depression-era dreams of a business com-
monwealth, and the difficulty of finding a place to eat lunch in mid-town
Manhattan. It is an epic; perhaps a tragedy.
II. THE FOUR PARAMETERS AND LLEWELLYN'S GOALS
FOR COMMERCIAL LAW
Especially helpful in studying and describing the history of the U.C.C.
is an examination of what factors control, construct, and regulate the
dealings between the parties to a commercial contract. There are four
parameters I wish to consider: positive statutory requirements, court or
administrative regulation, trade norms, and the contract arrived at by the
parties. By positive statutory requirements, I mean such legislation that
dictates the terms of a deal. Present examples of commercial regulation
include Truth-in-Lending regulation23 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act.24 Article 2 of the U.C.C. has a few such sections that are not varia-
ble by agreement, such as the right to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent 25
and the one-year minimum statute of limitations. 26 One must remember,
however, that the sections that can be varied by agreement will apply
unless the parties agree otherwise. Thus, the provisions create a stan-
dardized contract that controls unless the parties opt out of it.27 Gener-
ally, Parts 3 and 5 of the present Sales Article serve to set up a standard
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1994).
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994).
25. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1989).
26. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1996).
27. As Nathan Isaacs points out:
In ordinary transactions, people cannot or will not stop to make special
agreements "to the contrary." Therefore, they find themselves governed by
the statute with its prescribed insurance policy, its prescribed bill of lading,
warehouse receipt, stock-transfer, negotiable instrument, articles of partner-
ship, its prescribed type of sale. When the question arises whether title has
passed to a buyer, they will find the answer in the mechanical rules of the
code for the ascertainment of their "intention," a constructive intention. The
effect is a making of contracts in wholesale lots, just as we now make corpo-
rations in wholesale lots. A practical check on the individuality of contracts,
if not a theoretical limitation on the freedom of contract, and a standardiza-
tion of legal relations, are the net results.
Nathan Isaacs, The Standardization of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 38-39 (1917).
Nathan Isaacs was a contemporary of Llewellyn. Llewellyn cites this article in his sales
casebook. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 51
(1930) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, CASES].
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sales contract. Parties need only agree on a quantity term,28 however
loosely expressed, 29 and Article 2 will supply the price,30 delivery and
payment terms,31 time provisions, 32 and quality terms.33 Parties have to
contract out of the terms for them not to apply.
Another parameter that affects commercial dealings is ongoing court or
administrative regulation. Examples are the regulations of the Food and
Drug Administration and of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Article 2 does not set up any regulating body to oversee sales, but the
system set up by original drafts, which gave power to a judge working
with the merchants jury to invalidate contract terms and prescribe rea-
sonable practices, approximated a regulatory system.
Llewellyn's primary insistence, however, was on enforcing trade norms
in commercial law. I use the term "norms," rather than "practices," be-
cause he was looking for good, rather than merely standard, merchant
practices. Professor Leff points out that unconscionability is "one tech-
nique for controlling the quality of a transaction when free market con-
trol is ineffective. ' 34 But Llewellyn never started with the assumption
that free market control alone was effective. The bargaining process
needed control by the courts.35 He was searching to enact into law the
desirable social practices of merchants. In a letter expressing his hopes
and fears at the outset of his long enterprise of drafting the Code, he
wrote: "I feel very clear indeed that there are a reasonable quantity [sic]
of behavior sequences and the regulations of such sequences which are
desirable, so that the so-called social disciplines have reason for exist-
ence,-or that there are [no] such sequences, and no man knows such
desirabilities." 36
28. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1989).
29. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1989).
30. See U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1989) ("a reasonable price").
31. See U.C.C. § 2-511 (1989).
32. See U.C.C. § 2-309 (1989) ("a reasonable time").
33. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1989).
34. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Com-
mon Law Tradition, 31 U. Pirt. L. REV. 349, 350 (1970).
35. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 159 (1938).
I do not regard the dominance of bargain in our economy as even remotely
justifying passive acceptance by court or other tribunal of the letter of an
"agreement" merely because a "writing" turns up under that label. Those
once moderately fungible legal persons, A and B, or S and B, have ceased to
be at all fungible in fact; and the process of agreeing-which once implied
not only meditation but room to choose and freedom within that room, not
only choice but relatively conscious choice with some inkling of conse-
quence-that process, thanks to differential uses of forms, differential char-
acter of the forms used, differential knowledge, power and bargaining skill in
the "agreers," has also ceased to be fungible in fact. This means need for
control, lest old rules based on Adam Smithian postulates be made tools of
outrage.
Id. at 175 n.25.
36. Memorandum No. 1, from Karl N. Llewellyn to William H. Schnader (May 19,
1940) (on file with the University of Chicago Law School).
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Positive statutory regulation, administrative/judicial control, and the
imposition of trade norms together create a standardized contract that
supplants individual contracting. Nathan Isaacs points out this opposition
between standardized relations and intentions of the parties:
But so are many of the peculiarities of an agreement ignored in later
stages of society where a formal contract of this or that type results
in a more or less standardized relation. Here, we include not only
the early Roman forms of sale and the old English conveyances of
land, but marriage, the taking up of the feudal relation at other
stages in the law, and the purchase of a standard insurance policy to-
day. The point of likeness is that a relation results in which the de-
tails of legal rights and duties are determined not by reference to the
particular intentions of the parties, but by reference to some stan-
dard set of rules made for them. In origin, these relations are, of
course, contractual; in their workings, they recall the regime of
status.37
The history of the U.C.C.'s drafting can be seen as a conflict pitting the
standardizing forces of statutory dictates, administrative regulation, and
trade norms against the individualization of private contract. As stated
by Isaacs in 1917, "[s]ome of the greatest legal battles of the day are being
fought over statutory collisions with the principle of freedom of
contract." 3
8
To oversimplify, Llewellyn wanted to create a commercial law consis-
tent with both his anthropological vision 39 and the folkways of merchants;
Wall Street wanted to achieve an efficient, persuasive, profit-maximizing
commercial regime based on individual contracting. There are three
themes that constantly recur in Llewellyn's thought: the primacy of trade
usages, the goal of modernistic efficiency, and the need for balanced trade
rules. The history of the drafting of the U.C.C., therefore, is the story of
how the drafters attempted to make room for each vision, to choose be-
tween the visions, and to come up with devices that would mediate be-
tween them.
37. Isaacs, supra note 27, at 39.
38. Id. at 38 n.17.
39. The co-author with Llewellyn of THE CHEYENNE WAY, supra note 14, character-
ized him as a practicing anthropologist:
Llewellyn became a practicing anthropologist. Through the years he devel-
oped a wide knowledge of anthropological literature, and he accumulated
enough field experience to equal that of a good many full-time anthropolo-
gists. In addition to his relatively brief introduction to anthropological field-
work among the Cheyennes in 1936, he spent five full, consecutive summers
(1945-49) of field research on legal aspects of Pueblo culture among the Ker-
esan-speaking Pueblos of New Mexico. The present author was co-re-
searcher during four of the five summers, as was also Soia Mentschikoff
during three. The results of this research still await processing. He thought
of his own masterwork of research in terms of the anthropological jurispru-
dence of American appellate courts. "This study of lawways and primitive
law among the higher United States legal shamans," he called it. (Inscription
penned in this author's copy of The Common Law Tradition.)
Hoebel, Anthropoligical Jurisprude, supra note 14, at 738 n.13.
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Llewellyn wanted to apply the teachings of contemporary social science
to the law. These teachings gave rise to his goals for his proposed com-
mercial statute: the use of norms of merchant behavior, the achievement
of fairness that would result from balanced trade rules and equality of
bargaining, and the achievement of modernistic efficiency that would
come from discarding outmoded concepts and formal rules unrelated to
commercial reality. I have written at length of the contemporary back-
ground of Llewellyn's thought;40 here I wish to summarize the relation of
his reformist program to the social thought contemporary with the Code's
drafting.
Llewellyn saw merchants in anthropological terms, as being equivalent
to tribes with definite folkways. Three social scientists he cites as influ-
ences, John Commons, Franz Boas, and William Graham Sumner,41 were
all concerned with how a group evolved social customs, the "folkways. ''42
Llewellyn subscribed to the folkways concept:
I propose to ring changes, perhaps ad nauseam, on three simple facts:
first, that law observance is a question not of legal rules, but of the
formation of folkways that can be and will be learned chiefly without
direct reference to particular rules; second, that law and folkways
alike are not general and common to our society, but are different
and specific according to groups, occupational and other; and third,
that for mass, as contrasted with individual, attempts at control, the
problem of lawmaking and of law enforcement centers on informed,
sustained effort to find the particular persons whose conduct is con-
cerned, and to devise means for affecting the conduct patterns of
those particular persons.43
In an unpublished article, This Cut Rate American Culture,44 Llewellyn
explicitly equated trade with tribe. Although Americans look alike, they
divide into occupations: "But the cultures of today grow apart less by
places than by occupations. As voters or as theater goers we are one
tribe, alike. As bricklayers, plumbers, coal miners, corn belt farmers,
40. See Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Re-
alism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325 (1995).
41. See Karl N. Llewellyn et al., Law and The Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 82, 84 n.1 (1931).
42. In discussing folkways, Sumner stated:
They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in oper-
ation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed
out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an
interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or
variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited
methods, and without rational reflection or purpose.
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE
OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS 4 (1940); see also JOHN R. COM-
MONS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 125-26 (1950) (to Commons, "working
rules" governed how workers did their jobs).
43. Karl N. Llewellyn, Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 127 (1928), reprinted in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURIS-
PRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 399 (1962).
44. Karl N. Llewellyn, This Cut Rate American Culture (1927), microformed on Karl
N. Llewellyn Papers B.V.3.j. (on file with SMU Law Review).
[Vol. 51
HISTORY OF THE U.C.C.
hardware men, we are as different as are Czechs and Spaniards. '45
Therefore, merchants carry on their trade against a background of trade
custom and usage. These trade usages, like folkways, compete under a
social Darwinistic model of human behavior to gain acceptance. As
stated by Karl N. Llewellyn folkways are
like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in opera-
tion, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are devel-
oped out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum
adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and
admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new condi-
tions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational re-
flection or purpose.46
Another thinker who influenced Llewellyn, John Commons, noted that
commercial practices evolve in a more conscious manner:
Their evolution is like that of a steam engine or a breed of cattle,
rather than like that of a continent, monkey or tiger. If you watch
how the steam engine evolved from John Watt in 1776 to the Mogul
locomotive in 1923 you will see how economic institutions evolved.
The steam engine evolved by studying the mechanisms of nature, ex-
perimenting with the parts, and then rearranging them, so that steam
would act in two directions instead of one direction, as nature in-
tended. So with the evolution of that process of behavior which we
name political economy. The subject-matter is the habits, customs
and ways of thinking of producers, consumers, buyers, sellers, bor-
rowers, lenders and all who engage in what we name economic trans-
actions. The method has been the adoption of common rules
applying to the similar transactions of all who come within the same
concern .... The desirable customs were selected gradually by the
courts, the undesirable customs were progressively eliminated as bad
practices, and out of the whole came the existing economic process, a
going concern, symbolized by a flux of prices, and operating to build
up an artificial mechanism of rules of conduct, creating incorporeal
and intangible property quite different from the unguided processes
of nature.47
Llewellyn drew on both Sumner and Commons to develop his own
commercial jurisprudence:
Pound has developed the idea of rules of law as "norms of conduct,"
as opposed to standards of judgment or rules of decision of disputes.
Commons has married this concept with Sumner's "folkway," in his
concept of working rules, which may be law-created, but more com-
monly are created by men's experiment, and only later taken over by
the law. Such seems to have been the almost universal process in
primitive law.48
Thus, Llewellyn's Code has been characterized as "rather like a consti-
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 376-77 (1924).
48. Llewellyn, Effect, supra note 14, at 671 n.20.
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tution-a framework for internal groups."'49 Llewellyn often wrote of an-
other concern: the efficiency that modernistic standardization can
produce. Standardized contracts fit in with high-volume, modern, effi-
cient production. In 1931, he stated:
Standardized contracts in and of themselves partake of the general
nature of machine-production. They materially ease and cheapen
selling and distribution. They are easy to make, file, check and fill.
To a regime of fungible goods is added one of fungible transac-
tions-fungible not merely by virtue of simplicity (the over-the-
counter sale of a loaf of bread) but despite complexity. Dealings
with fungible transactions are cheaper, easier. One interpretation of
a doubtful point in court or out gives clear light on a thousand fur-
ther transactions. Finally, from the angle of the individual enter-
prise, they make the experience and planning power of the high
executive available to cheaper help; and available forthwith, without
waiting through a painful training period.50
The third theme was his note is his concern over equal bargaining
power. Llewellyn was concerned, like many in the 1920s and 1930s, with
leveling the playing field in contractual bargaining. Thinkers who influ-
enced Llewellyn, such as John Commons and Robert Hale, saw laissez-
faire economics as being economically coercive of the weak by the strong
and sought, by legislation, to enable parties to bargain equally. 51 The
National Labor Relations Act is an example of this concern. 52 The type
of deal produced by equal bargaining was the normative standard by
which deals should be measured. An agreement was fair only if coercion
was absent. Coercion was more than physical threats; it could also stem
from one party's larger resources and ability to wait for the other party to
give in. A present-day economist explains the views of Commons:
Accordingly, outcomes will be "better" as they come progressively
closer to the outcomes that would obtain if everyone actually pos-
sessed equal power to wait for the other to give in, that is, equal
bargaining power. The same interpretation of "better" would obvi-
ously apply equally to the working rules that shape those
outcomes. 53
Equal bargaining leads to greater income for consumers, which leads to
increased consumption and production. "Underlying these reforms [the
NRA and other New Deal legislation] was the thought that in the twen-
ties too small a share of the national income had gone to workers and
49. Carol Weisbrod, Article Two as a Framework for Groups 6 (1986) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with SMU Law Review).
50. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 731 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, What Price].
51. See Yngve Ramstad, From Desideratum to Historical Achievement: John R. Com-
mons's Reasonable Value and the Negotiated Economy of Denmark, 25 J. ECON. ISSUEs 431
(1991); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sci. L. 470 (1923).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (collective bargaining serves to restore "equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees").
53. Ramstad, supra note 51, at 434.
[Vol. 51
HISTORY OF THE U.C.C.
farmers-the consuming classes-and too large a share had gone to
savers."
54
The process of equal bargaining also works to prevent "chiseling."
Llewellyn points out that "'chiseling,' the corner cutting practices or lop-
sided, oppressive usages which are unfair to one side of the bargain, de-
velop."' 55 Here Llewellyn referred to a central concept of contemporary
economics, or more precisely, the economics of the pre-Keynesian era,
which saw the "chiseler" as a central economic problem and a primary
cause of the Depression. A prevalent view was that chiseling created a
vicious cycle-it caused the lessening of the quality of goods and cheat-
ing, leading to the paying of lower wages, decreased demand, overpro-
duction, and, finally, to additional chiseling. This process was
characterized by chaotic fluctuations in production, shoddy goods, ruin-
ous cut-throat competition, and wages too low to support workers and
their families in minimum standards of health and welfare. 56
Llewellyn's expansion of the warranty of merchantability and making
express warranties non-disclaimable stemmed from his desire to cure the
downward spiral of chiseling. These concepts reintroduced trust and con-
fidence into the market:
Transactions look to future delivery; even where they do not, they
look to standard quality of goods produced in mass and grade, and
sold by name, brand, or description. Distribution of goods is indi-
rect, almost as of course; a buyer has only his dealer to trust to; it is a
dealer's business to know the goods he sells. As between dealers
(even as between retail-dealer and consumers), standing relations
mean goodwill; and goodwill is what makes turnover; and turnover is
what makes the balance-sheet wax fat. Confidence, not trickery, is
the basis of prosperity.5 7
Prevention of chiseling and control of the marginal businessman had
concerned Llewellyn since 1925, as shown in his article The Effect of
Legal Institutions on Economics,58 in which he wrote about the necessity
for the law to control the individual. The implications of his position are
hard to appreciate at first, because they are so contrary to our individual-
istic, "rights"-oriented way of thinking:
Finally, when one attacks the effect of the law in shaping conduct, is
the profusion of cases where established morals or habits of self-dis-
54. HERBERT STEIN, TiH FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 48-49 (1990). Stein
points out that American economists did not concern themselves with the theories of
Keynes until 1936 at the earliest. See id. at 149.
55. Karl Llewellyn, General Comment on Parts II and III Formation and Construction
38, microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers A.A.J.2. (on file with SMU Law Review)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, General Comment].
56. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President's Fireside Chat (May 7, 1933), in Louis
GALAMBOS, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: THE REEMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL
TRADE ASSOCIATION 198 (1966); DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF
LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (1988).
57. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699,
721 (1936).
58. See Llewellyn, Effect, supra note 14.
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cipline seem to make law unnecessary, one is led to hope that the
marginal concepts may point the road to understanding. The rules of
law against assault come into active play only at the individual mar-
gin when passion crosses the threshold of self-control, and come into
play socially only with that marginal individual who falls below the
standard of self-control commonly developed by early education.
For it seems clear that, if the marginal individual were not restrained
at least in the bulk of cases, either in self-defense or by imitation,
laxity in the matter would spread through the group; such is the pro-
cess of cut-throat competition. So, too, with the enforcement of con-
tract obligation; and this regardless of delays, costs, and occasional
acquiescence in the breach of contracts. 59
The individual at the margins is neither a member of a minority group
nor the non-conformist whose rights deserve the protection of the law,
but rather a criminal. The merchant who deviates from group standards
is not the entrepreneurial hero, but the cut-throat competitor. Group
norms are good; the legal problem is enforcing them.
Thus, rules that were the product of equal bargaining in trade associa-
tions would prevent chiseling; control the corner-cutting, marginal busi-
nessman; and would be fair, reasonable, and workable. Llewellyn's
program for achieving rules produced by equal bargaining power was
similar to those of the institutional economist John Commons. Professor
Charles Whalen describes Commons's views on how to achieve good
rules of behavior: "[T]he most appropriate social provisioning occurs
when a going concern's working rules are produced by disputants with
equal bargaining power." 60 Where such equality does not exist however,
Institutional Economics recommends that commissions (including repre-
sentatives of all affected parties) determine the rules governing economic
activity. Specifically, Commons sees commissions as bodies capable of
identifying and diffusing "the best practices of those concerns that actu-
ally maintain survival."'61
Whalen's description of Commons's programs also serves to describe
Llewellyn's. Llewellyn also wanted to achieve well-balanced working
rules of commercial law. His "commission" was at first the drafting com-
mittees of the Code, and then the judge who, working together within his
proposed "merchants tribunal," would regulate trade practices. He was
in search of the "good practices of the market place."'62
59. Id. at 682. Llewellyn's article on Commons probably grew out of a seminar on
business organizations which took place in the 1924-25 academic year, taught by Professors
Oliphant and Bonbright of the Columbia Business School. Fellow students included Un-
derhill Moore and Robert Hale, whose writings argued that unequal bargaining caused
economic coercion. See SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 3, at 16.
60. Charles J. Whalen, John R. Commons's Institutional Economics: A Re-Examina-
tion, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 443, 450 (1989) (citation omitted).
61. Id.
62. At the 1940 NCC Conference, a Mr. Harno stated:
My thought was that you are asking us to instruct the Committee to bring
in a draft which complies with or is in accordance with the practices of the
market-place. Now, that may be ....
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Llewellyn's system of incorporating trade association agreements into
the law resembles the operation of the National Recovery Administration
(NRA). The NRA sought to regulate the economy by empowering trade
groups to regulate themselves.63 The trade group was to establish codes
of fair competition that would stamp out "chiseling."' 64 Violations of the
codes would lead to criminal prosecutions, as they did in Schecter Poultry
Corp.65 In return, labor would obtain guarantees of minimum wages and
maximum hours and the right to engage in collective bargaining.66 The
contemporary importance of achieving fairness and preventing chiseling
is shown by the NRA's use as the program to cure the Depression in the
early New Deal.
The NRA promulgated specific industry codes that were usually pro-
posed by trade associations. The proposing group conferred with the
NRA's three advisory boards (representing business, labor, and the con-
sumer) and NRA officials. After this group reached a consensus, a public
hearing was held. After considering new proposals, the proposals were
sent on to the NRA administrator, who finally sent it on to the President
for final approval.67 The NRA codes of fair competition were to become
a "law merchant" for the relevant industry. 68 Thus, Llewellyn's system of
commercial law with the drafters, judges, and merchant tribunals seeking
the "better" trade practices and enforcing fair trade agreements resem-
bles that of the NRA. He and the NRA sought normative rules of com-
merce. "The balance he had struck in the earlier drafts was normative.
The rules were chosen as the better rules intended to establish better pat-
terns of behavior."'69 Furthermore, both the NRA and Llewellyn sought
rules specific to particular trades rather than relying on the universal
rules of classical contract law.70
Llewellyn replied: There was no such intention. I believe in controlling
the practices of the market-place where the practices of the market-place
need control. That is my personal opinion. I believe in conforming to the
practices of the market-place where they are sound to conform to. The law is
not to abdicate to business.
Mr. Harno: Then it is the good practices of the market-place?
Mr. Llewellyn: Right!
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Forty-Ninth Annual Con-
ference, at 14 (1940), microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers A.A.J.8 (on file with SMU
Law Review).
63. See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY
126 (1990).
64. See id.
65. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
66. See FREIDEL, supra note 63, at 143.
67. See BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA 37 (1975).
68. See BRAND, supra note 56, at 11 (1988). See generally HUGH S. JOHNSON, THE
BLUE EAGLE: FROM EGG TO EARTH (1935) (attempting to revitalize NRA principles by
discussing the author's experience as head of the NRA).
69. Barnes, supra note 13, at 126.
70. See Breck P. McAllister, Government and Some Problems of the Market Place, 21
IOWA L. REV. 305 (1936).
The particularistic character of the legislation of the codes [the NRA Codes]
should be preserved in any future legislation. If government is to legislate to
preserve a plane of trade methods or of competition in the market places, it
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Llewellyn's approach was not universally accepted. The internal ten-
sion between trade regulation and freedom of contract can be seen in an
objection by Hiram Thomas, the lawyer for the New York Merchants'
Association, to Llewellyn's approach:
Undue emphasis or stress is given to what might be called the varia-
tions or exceptions or limitations to fundamental contract rules. You
lose sight of the fundamental contract rules when we get into matters
of construction; it left me with the impression that what we are doing
in this Act is to enlarge and keep on enlarging the scope of the con-
tract and I got this impression that really what is written in the con-
tract even the dickered terms do not amount to much but the
emphasis upon the variation by usage and course of dealing. The
emphasis is not on the contract as written, but on the variation.71
After Llewellyn admitted an undue neglect of contract law, Thomas re-
plied, "I regard it as a stop to immature and superficial things." 72
III. THE 1940-41 DRAFTS
A. TRADE NORMS
Looking at our four parameters (statutory requirements, regulation,
trade norms, and contract), we may see that the initial U.C.C. drafts of
1940-41 legislated a commercial system based on regulation and trade
norms. For example, the Revised Sales Act of 1941 required a merchant
or banker to show that an action "was taken in the reasonable course of
business," in order to show "good faith;"'73 the withdrawn section 1-C
would have regulated form contracts and invalidated one-sided con-
tracts.74 "[T]he usage of trade, or of a particular trade" were "presumed
to be the background which the parties have presupposed in their bar-
gaining and have intended to read into the particular contract .... "75 It
was purposed that "fair and balanced" trade association rules be incorpo-
rated into sales contracts:
must be remembered that it is not legislating for any one market place but
rather for almost an infinite number of market places in which the practices
and the customs and the forces that are brought to bear on concrete transac-
tions are as myriad as the markets themselves. Practices will vary from mar-
ket to market and the same practice will have different economic effects in
different markets. The machinery of distribution, the methods of pricing, of
delivery, of service to consumers, and many other important matters, will be
different. To legislate in universals, as we have in the past, is to lay a crude
and heavy hand on a delicate and complex piece of economic machinery.
Id. at 319.
71. Joint Advisory Committee Meeting, at 1 (May 21-22, 1945), microformed on Karl
N. Llewellyn Papers J.VII.2.a (on file with SMU Law Review).
72. Id. Thomas was an outsider on the advisory committees while the others had pre-
viously worked together primarily in academia. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 285.
73. Draft for a "Uniform Sales Act, 1940" (1940), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE DRAFTS 217, 225 § 59-1(c) cmt. (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
74. R.U.S.A. § 1-C, reprinted in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFTS 18-25 (Elizabeth S. Kelly & Ann Puckett eds., 1995) (Section 1-C was withdrawn
and not included in the official drafts) [hereinafter CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS].
75. Draft for a "Uniform Sales Act, 1940," supra note 73, § l-D, at 334.
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Wherever the usages of a particular trade or mercantile situation
have, in whole or in part, been reduced to fair and balanced form by
a body representing both buyers and sellers of the character engaged
in a particular transaction, the incorporation of such body of usages
into the transaction, as the background of the particular terms of the
bargain, is presumed.76
Llewellyn proposed a standard of "mercantile performance" as a sub-
stitute for the commercial standard of strict performance. 77 Mercantile
performance was defined as that which would not materially increase the
risks or burdens on the buyer. 78 The merchant tribunal (a group of
merchants empaneled to decide commercial issues) would judge whether
a party's performance met the required standard. The mercantile per-
formance standard presupposed "a skilled and specialized mercantile tri-
bunal to pass on the questioned fact."
'79
Section 15 of the 1941 Revised Uniform Sales Act (the "1941 Act")
provided for the warranty of merchantability, defined in terms of trade
norms, "such as by mercantile usage pass without objection in the market
under the designation in the contract." °8 0 This definition appeared to
heighten the required quality of goods. However, there was disagree-
ment as to the contemporary meaning of "merchantable." One view held
that it meant only resellable. Also, there was no section that specifically
addressed disclaimer of warranty in the 1941 Revised Uniform Sales Act.
Section 1-D of the 1941 Act stated that "Between merchants, the usage
of trade, or of a particular trade ... are presumed to be the background
which the parties have presupposed in their bargaining and have intended
to read into the particular contract .... ." That section's comment pro-
posed that:
Wherever the usages of a particular trade or mercantile situation
have, in whole and in part, been reduced to fair and balanced form
by a body representing both buyers and sellers of the character en-
gaged in a particular transaction, the incorporation of such body of
usages into the transaction, as the background of the particular terms
of the bargain, is presumed.8 1
Section 11-A of the 1941 Act proposed to substitute a standard of mer-
cantile performance for the traditional commercial law requirement of
76. Id. § 1-D cmt., at 335.
77. Id. § l1-A, at 379-84.
78. Id. § 11-A(b), at 380.
79. Id. § 11-A cmt., at 381.
80. See id. § 15(2), at 390. See also 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING
SALES OF GOODS § 243, at 641-43 (rev. ed. 1948).
81. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 1-D cmt., at 355. Under the modern U.C.C.,
trade practices continue to be central, but in a different way. Usage of trade becomes part
of the "agreement." According to the U.C.C., "'Agreement' means the bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances includ-




strict compliance with contract terms.82 Mercantile performance was de-
fined as the situation in which the risks and burdens on the buyer were
not materially increased and the goods met the "operating or marketing
requirements of the buyer in the course of his business." 83 The comment
to section 11-A pointed out that the question of mercantile performance
was to be decided by the mercantile tribunal, which provided for
merchants' control of the standard. 84 The implied warranty of
merchantability was also redefined in terms of mercantile norms.85 Trade
associations were to set trade norms; the merchants' tribunal was to apply
them to specific situations.
The fixing of trade practice and standard is believed to be properly a
task for associations. The task here is to assure counsellors and buy-
ers and sellers of an informed judgment, after the event, as to what
trade practice, trade understanding, or the mercantilely reasonable,
comes to; so that both the making of a contract and action under it,
have some reliable basis to reckon with.86
The sections addressing "Merchant Experts on Mercantile Facts" pro-
posed a merchant jury system that would allow merchants themselves to
decide issues of commercial law.87 The merchant experts were to deter-
mine issues such as the contractual effect "of mercantile usage, or of the
usage of the particular trade," the "mercantile aspect of any delivery,"
the "mercantile reasonableness of any action," and "[a]ny other issue
which requires for its competent determination special merchants'
knowledge. "88
The merchants' jury provisions89 directly empowered merchants to ap-
ply trade norms and regulate the chiseler who did not conform to them:
82. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 11-A, at 378-81; cf. U.C.C. § 2-601
(1996).
83. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, §11-A(b), at 380.
84. The comment to section 11-A states as follows:
Presupposition: The proposed policy presupposes the availability of a skilled
and specialized mercantile tribunal to pass on the question of fact in case of
dispute. Section 59. There is no question of incurring the uncertainty which
would be involved by letting such a matter go in first instance to an ordinary
jury.
Id. § 11-A cmt., at 381.
85. See id. § 15(2), at 390.
Where there is a contract to sell or a sale by a seller who [regularly] deals in
goods of the kind or description required by the contract, there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable goods of that kind or descrip-
tion, i.e., of at least fair [average] quality, and such as by mercantile usage
pass without objection in the market under the designation in the contract,
and that they shall be reasonably fit for the ordinary and usual purposes for
which such goods are used. A manufacturer who sells his product "deals"
therein, within the meaning of this Act.
Id. See also WILLISTON, supra note 80, at 641-43 (indicating that "merchantable" had been
interpreted previously to mean only "resalable").
86. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 59-C cmt., at 536.
87. See id. introductory cmt. to §§ 59 to 59-D, at 531-37.
88. Id. § 59, at 534.
89. See id. §§ 59 to 59-D, at 534-37.
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[I]n transactions, certainty in negotiations, and reasonable insurance
against the mercantile tricks of the business chiseler and the jury
tricks of the legal chiseler, are not to be had without a sound and
workable procedural device to get such questions of mercantile fact
settled competently. 90
Professor Whitman traces Llewellyn's idea for merchant tribunals back
to nineteenth century German Romanticism, in which "the establishment
of lay commercial courts would represent direct rule for the Volk .... 91
To Llewellyn, "his Code was intended somehow to promote a rule of the
American people through an altered form of the rule of law."'92
The merchants jury was dropped early in the Code's drafting process;
today, it is hardly remembered. Llewellyn, however, saw it as an essential
part of the new sales law: "This is a key-problem, and a key-section;
some such solution is quite as vital for existing law as for law under the
[d]raft." 93
Professor Peter Winship points out the centrality of Llewellyn's
merchant tribunals. "This machinery for the determination of mercantile
fact is the foundation on which other important 1941 Draft provisions
rest."' 94 The tribunals were to ascertain both usages of trade and the stan-
dard of mercantile performance. 95
90. Id. introductory cmt. to §§ 59 to 59-D, at 532. See generally id. §§ 59 to 59-D, at
534-37.
91. James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's
German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 165 (1987).
92. Id. at 173. Professor Whitman states:
To be sure, Llewellyn's 1940-41 conception of the "friendly... neighborly"
Volk was not a German one. The Llewellyn of 1941 was guided as much by
the social vision of Frank Capra as by the legal-historical vision of Levin
Goldschmidt; behind Llewellyn's theorizing lay a Depression-era longing for
small-town cooperation and social normalcy, in which the power of the com-
munity would stand by the "little man" in his conflict with the "big man."
But if Llewellyn had a mental picture of the American people that differed in
detail from the Romantic picture of the German Volk, his hopes for commer-
cial law were fundamentally German Romantic hopes: he was motivated,
not only by a sober intellectual distrust of formalism, but by an intoxicated
faith that courts could somehow speak for the spirit of the nation. Llewel-
lyn's scheme represented, to be sure, realism of a kind. But it was realism
with a democratist tinge. Rule of merchant jurors, premised on staunch anti-
formalism, would be rule of the people. Commercial "reasonableness"
would be a subset of the American people's "reasonableness and decency."
The draft that Llewellyn laid before the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in September of 1941 would be a code for the American
Volk.
Id. at 173 (footnotes omitted).
93. Report of the Special Committee on a Revised Uniform Sales Act 6 (1941), reprinted
in 1 UNIFORM CODE DRArrs 281, 286 (Elizabeth Kelly ed., 1984).
94. Peter Winship, Jurisprudence and the Uniform Commercial Code: A "Commote,"





Looking at the 1941 Act in light of our four parameters, we see that
there are many positive statutory commands. Express warranties, for ex-
ample, are given by words of description and cannot be disclaimed. Ad-
ditionally, disclaimers of remedies are regulated in detail by the 1941 Act.
Most important, the 1940 draft contained a revolutionary proposal, pre-
dating section 402A of the Restatement 96 by more than twenty years,
which provided for direct liability of manufacturers to those injured in
person or property.97 This section, in one form or another, lasted through
the 1949 Draft. It finally was withdrawn due to heavy opposition, but it
did inspire modern products liability law. It read as follows:
SECTION 28. (NEW) OBLIGATION TO CONSUMER WHERE
DEFECT IS DANGEROUS.
(1) Where it can reasonably be foreseen that goods, if defective in
design, workmanship or material, will in the ordinary use thereof
cause danger to person or property, the manufacturer thereof by sell-
ing them or delivering them under a contract to sell, when they are
so defective in a manner not apparent to the ultimate users thereof,
assumes responsibility to any legitimate user thereof who in the
course of ordinary use is damaged in person or property by such
defects.
(2) "Manufacturer," within the meaning of this section, includes
any person who processes or assembles goods which he thereafter
markets for ultimate use in consumption, and any person who by
brand, tradename or otherwise assumes the position of a manufac-
turer or supervisor of manufacture.
(3) This section is subject to control by contact under section 18
only in contacts to sell or sale made by a merchant with a merchant
and only so far as concerns use by the merchant buyer.98
The 1941 Act contained a complicated set of rules governing contrac-
tual modification of remedies. 99 Modifications were to be examined in
terms of the trade, the contract, and the breach: "A modifying term is
valid which reasonably adjusts the remedy to the circumstances of[:] (a)
the trade; (b) the contract; [and] (c) the breach."' 00
Section 57-B provided for tight controls on modifying remedies by (a)
prohibiting any prevention of rejection or return; (b) limiting rejection or
return of non-conforming parts "of a whole dependent on such parts;" (c)
limiting the remedy to repair or replacement where the result would fail
"to give the buyer the substantial value contracted for;" and (d) "exclud-
96. See John B. Clutterbuck, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enter-
prise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1133 (1988) (discussing how Llewellyn's propos-
als formed the basis of strict products liability).
97. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 16-B, at 402-03. See also Report and
Draft for a "Uniform Sales Act, 1940" (1940), microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers
J.II.2.a. (on file with SMU Law Review) [hereinafter Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft].
98. Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, at 32.
99. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, §§ 57 to 57-C, at 514-522.
100. Id. § 57(2), at 514.
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ing or limiting consequential damages for defects due to reasonably
avoidable fault of the seller .... "101
Too numerous to note specifically are the special "merchant rules" that
pervade the 1941 Act and provide for the incorporation of merchant
norms into sales law. For example, (1) a buyer can recover expenses of
cover "which are by mercantile usage reasonable;" 10 2 (2) market price
may be determined at a place "which in mercantile judgment would serve
as a reasonable substitute;" 10 3 and (3) between merchants, consequential
losses from breach may be included "unless such losses are clearly out of
line with the general practice of the particular trade or market."'' 4
Many of the more intrusive and controlling sections of the first drafts
did not survive. Provisions for the direct liability of manufacturers, the
merchant tribunal, certain merchant rules, and the regulation of remedies
were dropped. Other regulatory provisions that cropped up in later
drafts were also ultimately rejected.105
The role of the comments to the 1941 Act should be mentioned. Until
1957, the proposed law explicitly gave the comments official status.106
The comments were to explain the act and the relations between the
parts. 107 Along with the comments, however, Llewellyn wanted a "short
treatise or handbook on every chapter . . . . The hand-book [was] in-
tended . . . to develop the use of the act, by judges in judging, and by
counselors in dealing with the practical situations involved."108
This idea of a "hand-book" seems to have developed into "introduc-
tory comments" drafted by Llewellyn, but never made it into an official
text. In 1944, Llewellyn spent two months drafting a thirty-four page In-
troductory Comment to Parts I and III of the Act relating to formation
and construction.10 9 Such introductory comments were to explain the use
of the Code, yet we will see that they never saw the light of day.110
C. THE REGULATORY MODEL
The system of creating, applying, and judging commercial law in the
Revised Uniform Sales Act of 1941 would have replaced the traditional
101. Id. § 57-B, at 520.
102. Id. § 58-E, at 530. See also Wiseman, supra note 16, at 465 (discussing in detail the
merchant rules).
103. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 65, at 558.
104. Id. § 70-A, at 566.
105. See discussion infra Part X.B.2. (discussing the secured transactions article's at-
tempt to regulate holders in due course in consumer transactions).
106. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 1-A(2), at 327; ROBERT J. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 9 (1970).
107. See Letter from Karl N. Llewellyn to William Draper Lewis (Feb. 27, 1942) (on file
with SMU Law Review).
108. Id.
109. See Statement of William Draper Lewis, at 5 (April 12, 1945) (on file with SMU
Law Review).
110. See William Draper, Report of the Director to the Meeting of the Executive Com-
mittee at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June 1, 1945) microformed
on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.VII.l.a. (on file with SMU Law Review).
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system of private contracting governed by legal and judicial control. The
revised system was one in which merchant practices, merchant associa-
tions, and merchant tribunals would govern commercial law. The judge,
with the merchant jury and trade associations to guide him, would have
had the power under section 1-C to rewrite the formal contract of the
parties.
The comments to the 1941 Act would have also increased the regula-
tory power of the courts. Today, the status of the comments is problemat-
ical. Should they be treated as legislative history or ignored as not being
enacted?111 Llewellyn originally saw the comments as a way to educate
courts as to the meaning of the statute as a whole: "[A] condition of
sound development by courts is an adequate commentary which guides to
the legal material concerned as a whole.' 112
In an introductory section to the 1941 Act, entitled The Problem of a
Semi-Permanent Code of a Whole Field, Llewellyn stated that it is neces-
sary for the courts to know of and apply the sense and purpose of a non-
readily amendable statute as well as its literal language:
Instead, where a statute seems to make good sense, and the courts
see what that good sense is, there has appeared a vigorous and
healthy practice-by no means consistent or universal, but present in
the daily work of the highest courts all through the country-to work
out the effect of the statute quite as much in terms of its sense and
purpose as in terms of its meticulously examined wording.113
The comments were to present and include the reason and principles of
the sections:
The way to induce a consistent approach by the courts in these terms
is
(a) to invite that approach expressly, and give it legislative
authorization;
(b) to make explicit the principles which underlie any series of par-
ticular provisions;
(c) to provide an authoritative Comment full enough so that the
reason and reasonableness of the provisions and the principles are
both apparent, and cannot be mistaken; and so that it is easy to see,
also, where the reason of a provision leaves off.114
The comment to section 1-A of the 1941 Act repeats these points and
argues that any comments have to be full and that they are necessary to
integrate the sections of the 1941 Act. 1 5
111. See NORDSTROM, supra note 106, at 9-10.
112. Karl N. Llewellyn, Memorandum to Executive Committee, Committee on Scope
and Program Section on Uniform Commercial Acts 4 (1940), microformed on Karl N.
Llewellyn Papers J.II.l.b. (on file with the SMU Law Review).
113. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, at 305.
114. Id.
115. See id. § 1-A(3) cmt., at 330.
What has been said above applies to every Uniform Act. But where the
Act is to be the law of a whole field, of semi-permanent character, and, as
projected, a chapter in a Uniform Commercial Code, the Comments must of
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Thus, the 1941 Act explicitly provides that the comments are to be used
as a guide in the construction of the Act.116 The original intent, there-
fore, was for the comments to explain the reasons and principles of the
Code. Some official recognition of the comments lasted until 1957.117
Such recognition meant that the comments definitely were to be used in
deciding cases and that courts were explicitly empowered to consider the
policies and principles of the statute in their decisions. The official recog-
nition of the comments would have increased the ability of the courts to
go outside the literal language of the Code and would have increased the
freedom and power of the courts to regulate commerce on the basis of
policy. The system resembles a regulatory, administrative law model,
such as the defunct National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), in which
groups of merchants were supposed to promulgate codes of fair competi-
tion that were to be given the force of law.118
The role of the judge under the proposed act was to be more like an
active administrative regulator than a neutral common law judge. The
judge would have worked with the merchants jury and trade association
rules in deciding sales issues. It was important to involve those affected
by commercial law-the merchants. The merchants were to supply the
facts and expert opinions necessary for the jurisprudence of legal realism:
necessity be rather full, and the importance of their receiving official recogni-
tion rises materially.
In particular, it is only in the Comments that the bearing of one section on
other sections can be consistently explored, and the Act integrated, for use,
into a working whole. No man can expect a Court handling a single case to
find time to absorb, for the purpose, an Act covering a whole field of law.
Cross-bearings of other relevant sections require to be built into the Com-
ment sufficiently to bring relevant matters reasonably together. Even more
important is the indication in the Comment of the reason and purpose of the
rules laid down, of the reasons for choosing one expression rather than an-
other, of the matters intended to be included, and of those intended to be left
out. The importance of the reason given grows, it must be repeated, with the
expected life of the Act, and with its expected resistance to detailed amend-
ment which would destroy uniformity. An ordinary statute, if misconstrued,
can be amended. A Uniform Act of a Whole Field must continue to make
out with its original language, and needs safeguard against misconstruction
by mistake of intention.
Id.
116. See id. § I-A(2), at 327.
Since uniformity of intent, construction and application is no less important
to the dominant purpose of this Act than uniformity of language, the Legisla-
ture declares that the Act is adopted for the purposes and with the intent set
forth in the official Comments of the Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, and that those comments are to be used as a guide in the
construction and application of this Act.
Id.
117. See NORDSTROM, supra note 106, at 9.
118. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) unconstitutional). See also Karl N. Llewel-
lyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699, 713, 721 (1936) (support-
ing some of the goals of the NIRA); Llewellyn, United Front, supra note 14, at 288
(supporting President Roosevelt's court-packing plan in response to Schechter), Llewellyn
saw a "guildish organization" like the NIRA as a cure for the problems of sales law. Karl
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: 11, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 380 (1937).
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The next feature of the modern style which strikes one could be
called factuality; it could be called realism; it could be called techno-
logical contact. Its essence is the supplementation of legal authority
on the one hand, and of ordinary common sense on the other, with
such technical data of fact and expert opinion as are available, or can
in the time at hand be made available, to inform a judgment. 119
Private contracting would have its place, but only within strict limits.
In 1937, Llewellyn advocated regulative legislation that would define
quality, lay down minimum standards, and invalidate contracts inconsis-
tent with statutory purpose:
Legislation, taking the major lines of regulation, can: (a) define stan-
dards of quality, and provide official inspectors, to make contract
language test up to what it says; (b) lay down minimum standards,
either in toto or for named grades, and provide ways of dealing with
would-be chisellers. This is Tudor regulation to keep the exploited
from having to use his own unpracticed judgment. It is colonial. It
lapses a little, in the 19th century. It is federal meat inspection as
distinguished from saying on the label to buyers who do not under-
stand, that this product contains blank percent of blank; (c) If the
goal is clear, legislation can, between merchants and in favor of con-
sumers, knock out contrary contract, or can even penalize attempts
to make contrary contract.'20
Indeed, although it is hard to believe that of the principal drafter of the
most widely adopted private law in history, Llewellyn did prefer an ad-
ministrative law system. In 1942, he wrote that law must be made intelli-
gible to those who use it. "Today, this is best bodied forth in legislation,
when well drawn, with lines of policy that any interested man can under-
stand, made clear, with technical detail left then to be handled flexibly by
administrative regulation."' 2'1 Such a system would involve those affected
as participants in the administration of justice.
Llewellyn's merchant tribunal provisions were designed to empower
merchants, to make them a part of the process of creating and administer-
ing commercial law. The determination of the best commercial rules was
to be made by the merchants, not by the legislatures, the ALl, or the
119. Karl N. Llewellyn, On The Good, The True, The Beautiful, In Law, 9 U. CHI. L.
REV. 224, 244 (1942) [hereinafter Llewellyn, On The Good].
120. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: 1I, 37 COLUM. L. REV.
341, 408 (1937) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Warranty II].
121. Llewellyn, On the Good, supra note 119, at 261. The Tennessee Valley Authority is
an example of the right approach:
When I watch the care, the skill, the patience, with which the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority is knitting the active cooperation of the beneficiary into every
least job undertaken for his benefit, I see a lesson in democratic government
which carries over into all the work of law. A man's rights must be accessi-
ble, but to be right rights, they must call also for some share on his part in
initiating or in working out their procurement, their fulfillment. Else law
remains remote, the government becomes an enemy or a dairy-cow, and the
morale of official, citizen, and group alike bogs in morass, and pressure-
groups become a by-word.
Id. at 263.
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NCC. Professor Wiseman points out that the merchant tribunal worked
to eliminate or reduce "the monitoring of merchant practices by the
larger community.' 2 2 That was the point; the merchants were supposed
to govern themselves.
D. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Looking at how freedom of contract would be limited by the 1941 Act
is simply restating what was discussed above. For example, a merchant's
form contract is invalidated under the proposed section 1-C, and a buyer
has to provide explicitly for exact performance. However, a party to a
contract can waive the requirement for strict performance by subsequent
conduct. 123 Express warranties shift the burden to the seller to show that
the buyer was aware of limitations, 124 and the implied warranties of fit-
ness for a particular purpose and merchantability cannot be disclaimed by
general language if a reasonable person would rely on the warranties. 125
The manufacturer's liability for defective products can be negated only by
a merchant buyer.126 Working together, the judge and the merchant tri-
bunal approach the function of an administrative agency fixing fair trade
practices. Trade norms are pervasive. They determine the meaning of
contract terms, fix standards of performance, and determine remedies.
Llewellyn saw the function of contract as providing for the regulation of
groups, not as structuring relations between individuals.
To sum up, the major importance of legal contract is to provide a
frame-work for well-nigh every type of group organization and for
well-nigh every type of passing or permanent relation between indi-
viduals and groups, up to and including states-a frame-work highly
adjustable, a frame-work which almost never accurately indicates
real working relations, but which affords a rough indication around
which such relations vary, an occasional guide in cases of doubt, and
a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to
work. 127
Individual contracting was not the focus of the Revised Uniform Sales
Act of 1941.
E. THE PROBLEM OF THE STANDARDIZED CONTRACT AND THE
FIRST DRAFTS
1. The Problem
A major concern of Llewellyn was standardized contracts. Llewellyn
proposed as part of the Revised Uniform Sales Act of 1941 a section 1-C
that was to regulate form contracts.1 28 The section was withdrawn and
122. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 515.
123. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 11-A(f), at 100-101.
124. See id. § 12(3)(b), at 105.
125. See id. § 15(6), at 110.
126. See id. § 16-B(3), at 123.
127. Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 50, at 736-37.
128. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 1-C, at 51.
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never made it into a proposed draft. However, it is important because it
grew into the present U.C.C. section 2-302, the unconscionability clause.
Another metaphor based on New York geography may be helpful to
understand the role of standardized contracts in Llewellyn's contractual
system. Situated on opposite sides of Central Park are the Museum of
Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the two main mu-
seums in New York. The Museum of Natural History contains exhibits
about seemingly disparate phenomena such as rocks, dinosaurs, and non-
Western tribes. Seen in light of the concept of evolution, however, one
realizes that the founders of that museum saw geology, biological evolu-
tion, and folkways as products of the unconscious process of natural his-
tory. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, however, exhibits products of
art-of artificial, conscious creation. Whether a particular artifact is a
tribal handicraft or a piece of art is still a question today. An article in
the New York Times, for example, discussed the question raised by an
exhibit of African artifacts displayed by the Royal Academy of Arts of
London. The Times noted that "[t]he show would revive the debate
about whether work done by anonymous African craftsmen was really art
.... But at the Royal Academy, objects made by African hands are
separated from their cultural context and can be judged simply as art.'112 9
A deal between merchants includes the products of evolution-trade
usages-and the products of artifice-consciously crafted contract lan-
guage. Llewellyn saw the need in his Sales Act to provide mechanisms
that considered both trade custom and individual bargaining in determin-
ing the legal effect of the commercial deal. The merchant tribunal, the
regulatory role of the judge, and the standardized contract section were
all mechanisms to do this. Moreover, form contracts could threaten both
established trade norms and individual bargaining. They were to be po-
liced by a section specifically dealing with form or standardized contract
language.
The differences between the early form contract sections and the pres-
ent section 2-302 represent a profound change in the nature of the Code.
The term "unconscionability" was not in the original drafts and, as we will
see, did not enter commercial law discourse until August of 1942, by way
of an off-hand comment by Hiram Thomas.130 Up to then, Llewellyn had
not concerned himself with the term, nor had he mentioned it in his writ-
ings. The genesis of what became section 2-302 lay in Llewellyn's concern
with the growing use of standardized contracts. His 1930 sales casebook
contains a case comment that discusses the issues raised by form con-
tracts.13 1 He points out that "[b]usiness men make contracts, especially
in sales transactions, against a background of more or less defined prac-
129. Alan Riding, "Primitive" No More: African Art Finds A Proper Respect, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1995, at H43.
130. See discussion infra Part V.A. Hiram Thomas was the lawyer and spokesman for
the New York Merchant's Association in the NCC proceedings. See Wiseman, supra note
16, at 520.
131. See LLEWELLYN, CASES, supra note 27, at 51.
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tices of the particular trade. This involves the case of shorthand symbols
such as "c.i.f.," "f.o.b.," etc. It involves assumption of most of the con-
tract without its expression.' 1 32 An increase in the size of firms "leads to
standardizing the contract. As a matter of internal administration the vir-
tues of this are clear; it amounts to machine production of transactions,
and makes available for the clerk who conducts a routine transaction the
experience of the executive and lawyer who drafted the form."'
133
Such form contracts can be oppressive:
Note that if the contract form has become really standardized among
competitors, or if the other bargaining party is at a bargaining disad-
vantage (the small apartment renter, the factory laborer, the shipper
of goods by railroad, the purchaser of steel or of insurance), we have
something approaching legislation by one group on its relations with
another group. In this aspect[,] the work of the I.C.C. and the regu-
lation of insurance policies become exceedingly interesting. The un-
willingness of courts to declare a clause void merely because it works
unfairness leads to their merely knocking out one clause after an-
other because it does not clearly express the position contended for;
which, in turn, means a fresh chance for the counsel of the one party
to accomplish the desired result in his new form.'3 4
2. Section 1-C of the 1941 Draft
With the above concerns in mind, Llewellyn proposed section 1-C. The
section was to be the key device to mediate between the Act's provisions
and individual bargaining. It was withdrawn, however, and never in-
cluded in an official draft. The proposed section can be analyzed as fol-
lows: first, the proposed Act represents a "balanced allocation of rights
and liabilities,"'1 35 developed out of the best case law and mercantile prac-
tice. Where, however, a provision of the Act is subject to agreement,
where parties "have deliberately desire to vary from the Act, the parties
particular bargain should control."'1 36 Particular trades and situations
may also require departure from the Act, and such departures may be




134. Id. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939) (reviewing
0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTs IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)). Llewellyn wrote the review just before the drafting of the
1940-41 Acts.
It is an unfortunate legal situation which puts it into the hands of any outfit
that can get the jump on its customer (as, for instance, by "our standard
form") or which can get the jump on whole categories of customers (as by an
automobile manufacturers' association standard form, or a seed dealers'
standard form) to twist the neck of commercial decency at any legal time and
in any legal manner it may choose. For it is the societal function of private
law, as of public law, to provide ring, referee, and rules.
Llewellyn, Warranty II, supra note 120, at 394 (footnote omitted).
135. R.U.S.A. § 1-C(1)(a), reprinted in CONFIDENTIAL DRAFrs, supra note 74, at 18.
136. Id. § 1-C(1)(b).
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where a group or bloc of provisions are not studied and bargained
about in detail by both parties, then actual assent to the incorpora-
tion of such a group or bloc.., is not in fact to be assumed where the
group or bloc of provisions, taken as a whole, allocates rights and
obligations in an unreasonably unfair and unbalanced fashion.137
Therefore, the following rules apply:
1. "If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to work a dis-
placement of the Act in an unfair and unbalanced fashion not re-
quired by the circumstances of the trade," then the party wanting to
apply a provision must show the other party intended the provision
to displace or modify the relevant provision of this Act.138
2. On the other hand, if the bloc as a whole is "shown affirma-
tively to work a fair and balanced allocation of rights and duties in
view of the circumstances of the trade, its incorporation into the par-
ticularized terms of the bargain is presumed."'1 39
3. "If no affirmative showing is made either way, then the entire
bloc" may be applied if justified.140
The comment to section 1-C notes the following: (1) particular trades
need particular rules, and it is best to specify these rules rather than to
leave it to the courts; (2) these rules, however, can be one-sided, or in
Llewellyn's words, "jug-handled;' 141 (3) the principle of freedom to bar-
gain goes only to an intended bargain. Merchants "think and talk of such
matters as price, credit, date of delivery, description and quantity. These
are the bargained terms. The unmentioned background is assumed to be
the fair and balanced usage of the particular trade;" (4) the courts have
adopted a variety of ad hoc responses to the situation, although, (5)
"[t]he true principle is clear enough: the expression of a body of fair and
balanced usage is a great convenience ... on the other hand, the substitu-
tion of private rule-making by one party... is not to be recognized with-
out strong reason shown."'1 42
Section 1-C emphasizes the incorporation of balanced trade rules as
opposed to private legislation. The section limits individual contracting;
therefore, bargaining that alters provisions of the Act must be shown af-
firmatively to be actually intended.
IV. THE MODERNIZATION OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE
Another of Llewellyn's goals was to reform contacts by discarding ob-
solete formalisms and instituting modern efficiency and flexibility. First,
the concept of title as an organizing principle of sales law was discarded.
Such a formal, abstract concept did not fit Llewellyn's modernistic and
137. Id. § 1-C(1)(d).
138. Id. § 1-C(2)(a).
139. Id. § 1-C(2)(a)(ii).
140. See id. § 1-C(2)(a)(iii).
141. Id. § 1-C cmt. (1), (2).
142. Id. § 1-C cmt. (2), (4), (5).
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realistic program. 143 Rather, the focus was on contract formation and
performance.'"
We have seen how Llewellyn attempted to change the weight of group
norms, judicial and legislative regulation, and individual contracting. He
also changed contract law itself. His first drafts proposed a new system of
contract law, one that replaces a formal and rigid doctrine with a flexible
one. Under Llewellyn's contract law, it is easy to get into a contract, but
hard to get out of one. The Statute of Frauds145 is the only remnant of
the formal contract system.146
Under the 1940 Draft, a contract could be made in writing, by word of
mouth, or inferred from conduct. 147 The early drafts rejected the doc-
trine of "indefiniteness" that held that all significant terms had to be
agreed upon for there to be a contract. For example, a contract could be
made with the price to be determined later, 48 and the quantity term can
be expressed as "output" or "requirements.' 49 Firm offers without con-
sideration are allowed. 150
The 1941 Act contained several alternative sections that change formal
contract rules of offer and acceptance and replace them with a focus on
"whether the parties, as a matter of fact, have reached a business agree-
ment to buy and sell goods.' 51 In the 1941 proposals and in today's
U.C.C., it is not necessary that a particular moment of agreement exists
and terms such as price can be set later. 52 Together these sections work
against older doctrines, such as the Statute of Frauds, formal require-
143. By "modernistic," I mean the discarding of old methods and rules in order to
achieve such goals as productivity, efficiency, and rationality.
144. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-101 (1989).
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale and
the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are stated as
following directly from the contract and action taken under it without resort-
ing to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the
determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between
practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing
of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstrac-
tions proof of words and actions of a tangible character.
Id. § 2-101 cmt.
145. Id. § 2-201.
146. Section 2-201 just requires "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought .... Only the quantity term must be specified. See id. § 2-201(1). Section 2-201
is subject to the exceptions of specially manufactured goods and of goods that have been
paid for or accepted. See id. § 2-201(3). Furthermore, unlike prior law, one cannot admit
to a contract and still use the Statute of Frauds as a defense. Once a contract is admitted,
section 2-201 becomes irrelevant. See id. § 2-201(3)(b), cmt. 7.
147. See Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 12. See also U.C.C. § 2-206
(1989).
148. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 9(4); U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-305(1) (1989).
149. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 44(4). See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1989).
150. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2 § 3(b)(2). See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1989).
151. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, Alternative § 3-A(1), at 67. See U.C.C. § 2-
204(3) (1989).




ments, the mirror image rule, and indefiniteness, which would defeat the
finding of a contract. It is much easier under the Code to be bound con-
tractually than it was under classical contract doctrine.
Once in a contract, it is more difficult to get out of one. Llewellyn
wanted to substitute "substantial performance" for the strict performance
standard of commercial law.153 Although his proposal was rejected for
single-installment contracts, 154 it was retained for installment contracts 155
and for delays in shipment15 6. The buyer's right to reject is further lim-
ited by the requirement of good faith, course of dealing, course of per-
formance, and usage of trade.157 The right to cure a defective tender also
limits the ability of a buyer to get out of a contract. 158 The limit on rejec-
tion for failure of transportation and the right to cure were introduced in
the early Drafts. 159 The 1941 Act also provided for what is now known as
"adequate assurance of performance"' 60 in order "to provide informal
machinery for adjustment" to keep deals alive. 161
The first drafts gave a wronged party more flexibility in remedies and
easier ways to prove them. Llewellyn wanted to restrain the marginal
wrongdoer who violated social norms. As he said in What Price Contract,
if the contract-breaker were not responsible, he could breach with impu-
nity and "[o]nly saps [would] work .... -162 Additionally, Llewellyn
wanted to free damages from formal requirements. "The claimant shall
not be forced to elect one theory of damage measurement, but shall de-
velop each of any alternative theories separately, and develop each in its
entirety at any one time."' 63 No precise theory of damages is required:
"Under the draft the search is not for the correct measure of damages,
but for a measure which is reasonable, and a recovery based on any such
measure is to be sustained. '164
Thus, Llewellyn created the buyer's remedy of "cover," the buying of
substitute goods.165 The right to specific performance was broadened
from situations in which the goods are unique to those in which they are
not "readily procurable,"' 66 and a buyer can sue for damages even if he
153. See Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 2(a); U.C.C. § 2-601 (1989).
154. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1989).
155. See id. § 2-612.
156. See id. § 2-504.
157. See id. §§ 1-203, 1-205, 2-208.
158. See id. § 2-508.
159. See Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 67(3). See also R.U.S.A., 1941
Draft, supra note 2, § 54.
160. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1989).
161. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 45(5)(b).
162. Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 50, at 725 n.47.
163. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 63-B(2). See U.C.C. § 2-608, cmt. 1 (1989).
164. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 63-B cmt. (2).
165. Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 68. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (1989).
Llewellyn's innovation is described as "radical" in Barnes, supra note 13, at 125 n.24.
166. Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 86 cmt., at 256. See U.C.C. § 2-716
(1989).
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has accepted the goods.167 Other liberalizations included the use of sub-
stitute markets to fix damages 168 and the option to complete work on
goods rather than junk them.169
The principles underlying the remedy sections were "that the remedy
shall be adequate, flexible, and as direct and speedy as may be .... -170
The entire contractual system of sales reflects that "an approach to the
contractual relation has been developing which deals with contract less as
an arm's-length single deal than as a getting together on a type of joint
venture .... ,,171
Llewellyn's modernistic proposals to reform contract law, with the ex-
ception of the controversy over his attempted abolition of the perfect
tender rule, drew less protest and were the most successful of his reform
efforts. The drafters of the Code must have known what they were doing.
In 1941, Samuel Williston pointed out that the drafters were ignoring set-
tled principles of contract law.172
Not a few of the sections of the draft state principles of contract law
which are of general application. The Law Institute spent years in
the preparation of a Restatement of the Law of Contracts. In draft-
ing the sections of the Restatement, cases involving sales were often
the chief authority. It seems unfortunate that this draft gives so little
heed to the Restatement. 173
Of course, reform of contract law formation did not threaten any eco-
nomic interests as did, for example, the direct action against manufactur-
ers. During the drafting process, contract law became even less formal.
For example, the "conforming memorandum" exception was added to the
Statute of Frauds, and the "battle of forms" section 174 was introduced to
do away with the "mirror image" rule. Llewellyn's changes in sales con-
tract doctrine went on to change general contract doctrine in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts.175
Llewellyn accomplished this major change of contract doctrine even
though this was not one of his main concerns, such as making merchant
norms the basis of commercial law and achieving fairness and balance.
His "General Comment" on contract formation and interpretation fo-
cuses on merchant practices and fairness, not on a more modern contract
doctrine. Yet it was his proposals to modernize contracts, not those to
institute a merchant tribunal, to regulate form contracts, and to police
contracts for balance, that became central to the modern law of contracts.
167. Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 87(1)(c). See U.C.C. § 2-608
(1989).
168. Uniform Sales Act, 1940 Draft, supra note 97, § 82(3). See U.C.C. § 2-723 (1989).
169. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 63-A(3), at 275; U.C.C. § 2-704 (1989).
170. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 56-A, at 233. See U.C.C. § 1-106 (1996).
171. R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 46-A cmt., at 195.
172. See Comments by Samuel Williston on Revised Uniform Sales Act/Second Draft-
1941, ALl Archives (on file with SMU Law Review).
173. Id.
174. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1989).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
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V. YOU MIGHT USE "UNCONSCIONABLE"-REGULATION
OF FORM CONTRACTS STARTS TURNING INTO
UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. "UNCONSCIONABILITY" ENTERS SALES DISCOURSE
Llewellyn's first drafts created a system in which judges and merchants
juries would have extensive regulatory power over sales contracts. Sec-
tion 1-C would have empowered courts to disregard contractual terms by
considering whether they were actually bargained over, the source of the
terms, and the consistency of the terms with equality, balance, fairness
and trade practices. The section applied to merchant-merchant transac-
tions as well as merchant-consumer transactions, and explicitly concerned
equal bargaining power. Issues raised by the section were to be applied
in part by a merchants jury, focusing on provisions other than the explic-
itly bargained-for price and quality terms. It applied to all form con-
tracts, not just those so unfair as to be unconscionable. This section grew
into the present section on unconscionability, section 2-302.
But what does section 1-C have to do with unconscionability? Not
much. While the present section 2-302 applies to all contracts, it primar-
ily applies to those involving consumers, 176 and is decided on the subjec-
tive basis of whether or not a provision shocks the conscience, and not
directed to questions of unequal bargaining power.177 Issues arising
under the section are a matter of law to be decided by the judge alone, 178
and the section is concerned more with questions of price and quality
rather than contract provisions that differ from those of the U.C.C. or
normal trade practices.
One should not be surprised that Llewellyn's initial proposals did not
contain anything about unconscionability, as he had never written about
the concept, or even considered it.179 The term entered the Code as a
result of an off-hand comment by Hiram Thomas at an NCC meeting in
August of 1942. Thomas was notorious for speaking without thinking. In
December of 1942, William Draper Lewis, the director of the ALI, com-
plained that Thomas was wasting time: "The difficulty, so it seems to me,
is more than his habit of merely thinking out loud .... His difficulty is to
176. See WHITE & SUMNERS, supra note 10, § 4-9, at 155, 237 (stating that section 2-302
should rarely apply to merchant-merchant deals); Steven Goldberg, Unconscionability in a
Commercial Setting: The Assessment of Risk in a Contract to Build Nuclear Reactors, 58
WASH. L. REV. 343 (1983) (discussing unconscionability in non-consumer commercial
settings).
177. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989).
178. See id. § 2-302(1).
179. Here, my story of the unconscionability clause differs from Professor Arthur Allen
Leff's brilliant analysis in Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) [hereinafter Leff, The Emperor's New Clause]. He breaks
the concept of unconscionability into the two components of substantive unconscionability
and procedural unconscionability and reviews the history of the clause in order to ascertain
how the drafters considered these two components. See id. at 488-528. I start with Llewel-
lyn's form contract clause and describe what it grew into, rather than looking backward to
explain the present law.
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see the issue in a sufficiently clear manner to prevent his talking about
irrelevant matters.' 180
Lewis did not realize that this habit of "thinking out loud" initiated the
creation of the unconscionability doctrine in sales. At the 1942 NCC con-
ference, discussion was on modifications of remedies. 181 Llewellyn was
concerned with unreasonable contractual limitations of statutory reme-
dies. However, he saw the need for "individualization" of remedies in
certain instances, for example, the need for a seller to call for expert re-
pair of farm equipment rather than have the farmer indulge in amateur
tinkering. 182 Thomas was worried about the use of the term "reasonable"
as a guide to what would be a permissible modification of remedies be-
cause the meaning of the term was elusive. 183
At a 1942 meeting, Mr. Stanley criticized the practice of listing specific
instances of remedy limitations that were permissible and suggested in-
stead that the non-permissible limitations be listed. 84 Hiram Thomas
pointed out that many sales clauses may seem unreasonable, but are not,
and suggested that the problems lie at the extreme and should be
prohibited:
There are certain things that are obviously so contrary to public pol-
icy that no court would stand for certain provisions in contracts.
Your gold bond case that Mr. Llewellyn mentions is one of them.
That is just plain fraud, and I think if that case ever got before the
court, it wouldn't take five minutes to dispose of it. But those are
not in the ordinary course of business. They are tricks of occasional
sharpers, and a man who tries that thing very often isn't going to stay
in business long. I don't know how a statute which has to be phrased
in general terms is going to expect to cure all possible abuses in the
trade. I am afraid of this thing as it stands. That is about all I can say
about it now. I quite agree that certain practices should be prohib-
ited if we know what they are and can provide against them with
some degree of particularity. There are statutes which do limit these
restrictions on warranties in certain trades. I have had those called
to my attention. 185
Thomas saw the remedy limitations sections as manifesting "a desire to
prevent what are essentially tricky and fraudulent practices."'1 86 It was at
the end of this discussion that Thomas suggested the alternative term
"unconscionable." He was searching for some standard that would distin-
guish between permissible and impermissible limitations of remedies,
stating:
180. Letter from William Draper Lewis to Willard B. Luther, ALI Archives (Dec. 17,
1942) (on file with SMU Law Review).
181. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Fifty-Second An-
nual Conference (1942), microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.IV.2.f (on file with
SMU Law Review) [hereinafter 52d Annual NCC Conference].
182. Id. at 25-26.
183. See id. at 28.
184. See id. at 27.
185. Id. at 29.
186. Id. at 31.
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I would suggest "or oppressively," some word like that. If you are
going to have some standard, let it not be pure reason. You might
use "unconscionable" or something the court can look at and say,
this is so arbitrary and oppressive and unconscionable that we won't
stand for it.187
Llewellyn welcomed Thomas's suggestion: "[t]he line of thought raised
by 'unconscionable' is exactly what one wants and also gives a draftsman
guidance. You can tell when you are approaching the verge of the uncon-
scionable. ' 188 Thus entered the term "unconscionable" into the discourse
of commercial law. The term "unconscionable" would go on to hijack the
proposed section 1-C and convert that section into something entirely dif-
ferent. Perhaps Llewellyn, whose jurisprudence of legal realism dispar-
aged formalism, did not see how the power of the term
"unconscionability" would profoundly change the application of the
U.C.C.
Llewellyn's initial draft proposed a tight regulatory scheme prohibiting
everything that was not expressly permitted. For example, form contracts
and limitations of remedies were invalid unless validated by the Act.
Now, form contracts and limitations of remedies were valid unless ex-
pressly invalidated by the Act. In procedural terms, the burden of per-
suasion was placed on those seeking to invalidate the contract.
Additionally, the Act evolved from a statute that would regulate the run-
of-the-mill commercial transaction to one that would invalidate only the
one at the margins, the supposedly rare deal infected with fraud or trick-
ery. Moreover, the first drafts regulated run-of-the-mill deals using defi-
nite standards, such as equality of bargaining, and reasonableness in
terms of the trade and the merchant's needs. Now these transactions
would be regulated under vague terms such as "unconscionable" and
"commercially reasonable."
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY: THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE
Unconscionability, at the time of Hiram Thomas's comment in 1942,
was an obscure concept with a long history. A review of old treatises,
legal encyclopedias, and case books reveals that it had only marginal his-
torical importance at best. The encyclopedia Corpus Juris89 does not
mention the term in the outline of its section on contracts, although its
section on equity does cite to the doctrine. 190 Langdell's 1879 case book
does not include the doctrine, 191 while Parsons, the author of another
early treatise, only mentions it in a single sentence. 192 The doctrine was
187. Id. at 33.
188. Id. at 34.
189. See 13 C. J. Contracts §§ 214-34 (1917).
190. See 21 C. J. Equity § 87 (1920).
191. See CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS Part 11 (1879).
192. See THEODORE PARSONS, LAW OF CONTRACTS (1884).
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historically restricted to equity.193 There was little evidence that the
Pennsylvania courts had ever dealt with the concept at the time of the
Code's adoption in that state.194 Thomas and Llewellyn, in the NCC
Conference of 1942, seem to have been searching for some boundary
term that would limit the power of judges to invalidate contract language
that varied the remedy sections of the proposed Act.195 A standard of
"reasonable" would invalidate too many remedy limitations, whereas a
standard of "unconscionable" would only invalidate the more extreme
remedy limitations. The distinction is equivalent to that between negli-
gence and gross negligence. It is difficult, if not impossible, to explain the
difference, but it does draw a line between behavior that is somewhat bad
and behavior that is really bad. Llewellyn used the term in the next draft
of the form contract section:
Section 24. Form Clauses, Conscionable and Unconscionable. (1) A
party who signs or accepts a writing evidencing a contract for sale
which contains or incorporates one or more form clauses presented
by the other party is bound by them unless the writing when read in
its entirety including the form clauses is an unconscionable contract
and he has not in fact read the form clauses before contracting, ex-
cept that a merchant who signs and returns such a writing after hav-
ing had a reasonable time to read it is bound by it.196
By using the term, the U.C.C. refers to, if not adopts, the doctrine of
unconscionability developed by the English equity courts.197 This is a
standard interpretation of section 2-302.
For at least two hundred years equity courts have refused to grant
specific enforcement of, or have rescinded, contracts so unconsciona-
ble "as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other." The doctrine of unconscionability is enshrined in the statu-
tory law of forty-nine states.198
The history of the equitable doctrine reveals, however, that the uncon-
scionability concept served vastly different social purposes than Llewel-
lyn's proposed form contract section. The English doctrine concerned the
preservation of estates, the protection of those in vulnerable circum-
stances, the invalidation of really stupid bargains, and the prevention of
quasi-fraud. It did not serve to invalidate commercial contracts that
stepped outside of accepted trade norms.
193. See KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT 316 (1990).
194. See Bernard D. Broeker, Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transfers, 15 U. PITT. L.
REV. 541, 557 (1954).
195. See 52d Annual NCC Conference, supra note 181.
196. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 492 (citations omitted). The
collected drafts do not include the 1943 version. Professor Leff's article does reproduce
§ 23 and a copy is in the Karl Llewellyn Papers. See id.
197. See generally K.L. Fletcher, Review of Unconscionable Transactions, 8 U. QUEENS.
L.J. 45 (1973).
198. WHITE & SUMNERS, supra note 10, § 4-2, at 208 (citing Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1989).
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The English doctrine dates back to its use by Lord Jeffreys in Berney v.
Pitt.199 There, the plaintiff had borrowed £2,000 from the defendant with
the proviso that if the plaintiff debtor outlived his father and came into
the estate or if he should marry, he would pay the defendant £5,000. The
plaintiff's bill prayed for relief from the debt, "which complained of a
fraud, and a working upon the plaintiff's necessity when in streights.
'200
Lord Jeffreys saw this as an "unconscionable bargain. '20 1 In Twisleton v.
Griffith,20 2 the court observed that Lord Jeffreys in Berney had declared
"that these bargains were corrupt and fraudulent, and tended to the de-
struction of heirs sent to town for their education, and to the utter ruin of
families; and that the relief of the court ought to be extended to meet
with such corrupt and unconscionable practices. '20 3
Thus, the unconscionability doctrine grew out of the English Court's
concern with family property. John Habakkuk points out that Chancery
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries protected the family
estate.20
4
Chancery was hostile to transactions which "supplied the necessities
of young heirs for lucre," that is, which enabled heirs to borrow on
their expectations .. . .When legal logic left such wide room for
social sympathies, it cannot be irrelevant that almost all the Lord
Chancellors of the eighteenth century ... established landed families
and had personal experience of the problems of such families.
20 5
Berney206 and the case that attempted to systemize the unconscionability
doctrine, Chesterfield v. Janssen,207 grew out of the practice of an expec-
tant heir borrowing on his expectations "in return for an undertaking to
pay back a much larger sum when his expectations were realized.
'208
Chesterfield involved a cast of characters that today could be in People
magazine. It concerned the estate of John Spencer, the grandson of the
First Duke and Duchess of Marlborough, 209 who was "addicted to several
199. 23 Eng. Rep. 620 (1686).
200. Id. at 621.
201. Id.
202. 24 Eng. Rep. 403 (Ch. 1716).
203. Id. at 404. Lord Jeffreys is better known for his "hang'em high" practices during
the Bloody Assizes after The Monmouth Rebellion, in which he showed no mercy to the
defeated rebels. Jeffreys's punishment of the rebels and his invalidating such contracts as
in Berney can be seen as both stemming from his desire to preserve the settled English
system of authority and inheritance. The court in Twisleton pointed out that keeping an
heir without funds would increase a father's authority: "this might force an heir to go
home, and submit to his father, or to bite on the bridle, and indure some hardships; and in
the mean time, he might grow wiser, and be reclaimed." Id.
204. See JOHN HABAKKUK, MARRIAGE, DEBT, AND THE ESTATES SYSTEM: ENGLISH
LAND OWNERSHIP: 1650-1950 71 (1994). "In all cases, however, the test which Chancery
applied to its interpretation of any particular provision or situation was simple: was it for
the benefit of the family?" Id.
205. Id. at 73.
206. 23 Eng. Rep. 620 (1686).
207. 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750).
208. HABAKKUK, supra note 204, at 269.
209. See id.
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habits prejudicial to his health, which he could not leave off."2 10
Spencer was the younger son of the family that was to inherit the
dukedom (it is from the elder branch that Sir Winston Churchill de-
scended), but he (along with his sister Diana) was his grandmother's fa-
vorite and became her chief legatee.211 John Spencer is an ancestor of
the Earl Spencer, and thus of the late Princess Diana. Chesterfield de-
scribed his situation and that of his grandmother, the Duchess of
Marlborough:
[s]he was seventy-eight; of a good constitution for her age; and care-
ful of her health. He sent to market a proposal, which he supposed,
would easily meet with a purchaser; as it was natural to expect in
common course, that his grandmother should die first, though she
was a good old life, and he but a bad young one.2 12
His proposal was that he would pay his lender double if his grandmother
died before him, but nothing if he died first. Although Spencer was des-
perate at the time of the loan, he had great financial expectations as his
grandmother's favorite. The grandmother did die first, but John Spencer
died the next year. His executor, the Earl of Chesterfield, brought an
action for relief from paying double the amount borrowed under the
terms of the agreement.
Relying in part on the fact that the creditor had not acted wrongfully
and that Spencer had refinanced his debt after his grandmother's death,
the court gave relief only from the penalty. The Chesterfield case did
attempt to systematize the doctrine of unconscionability.2 13 It was seen
as a type of fraud:
There has been always an appearance of fraud from the nature of the
bargain .... In most of these cases have occurred deceit and illusion
on other persons not privy to the fraudulent agreement: the father,
ancestor, or relation, from whom was the expectation of the estate,
has been kept in the dark: the heir or expectant has been kept from
disclosing his circumstances, and resorting to them for advice, which
might have tended to his relief and also reformation.2 14
What was so unconscionable in Chesterfield? Speculating on the death
of one's grandmother seems tacky, but should it be illegal? The case re-
jects any such policy, as argued by Professor Epstein, that individuals
should be able to order their private affairs without interference from the
government.2 15 That was the point; the English equity courts did not see
the parties as individuals but as representing but one generation in an
ongoing family. John Spencer was not a private citizen; he was the grand-
son of a Duke and the father of Earls. Therefore, the estate had to be
210. Chesterfield, 28 Eng. Rep. at 82.
211. See A. L. ROWSE, THE EARLY CHURCHILLS, AN ENGLISH FAMILY 53 (Greenwood
Press 1974) (1956).
212. Chesterfield, 28 Eng. Rep. at 82.
213. See generally Fletcher, supra note 197, at 50-52.
214. Chesterfield, 28 Eng. Rep. at 101.




transmitted from one generation to another without interference. Fur-
thermore, the Churchills, Spencers, and Chesterfields were not separate
from the government but, at times, were the government. The unconscio-
nability doctrine thus served to prohibit the family from individual
contracting.
Chesterfield also refers to cases of sharp dealing, betrayals of trust, and
"uncontentious bargains." Over the centuries such cases made up most
of the instances in which the unconscionability doctrine was applied. Pro-
fessor Leff lists the type of cases:
In these cases one runs continually into the old, the young, the igno-
rant, the necessitous, the illiterate, the improvident, the drunken, the
naive and the sick, all on one side of the transaction, with the sharp
and hard on the other. Language of quasi-fraud and quasi-duress
abounds. Certain whole classes of presumptive sillies like sailors and
heirs and farmers and women continually wander on and off stage.
Those not certifiably crazy, but nonetheless pretty peculiar, are often
to be found. And in most of the cases, of course, several of these
factors appear in combination.2 16
As stated above, the doctrine was obscure, being noted only in footnotes
or marginal sections of legal texts. The reasoning of Chesterfield was spe-
cifically rejected by Learned Hand in 1916 in Provident Life & Trust Co.
v. Fletcher.217
216. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 532-33 (citations omitted).
217. 237 F. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). Like John Spencer, one Conrad Morris Braker had
borrowed money with the proviso that if he died before age 55, his creditor would get
nothing; but that if he lived until age 55, and thus inherited the corpus of a trust that would
vest at that age, his creditors would get more than what had been borrowed. Braker had
been refused life insurance because of "a supposed affection of the kidneys." Id. at 106.
To simplify, the creditor sued to realize on the larger amount. Learned Hand enforced
the bargain, rejecting the authority of Chesterfield:
The second question of law is whether the case is one of those "catching
bargains" against which a court of equity will relieve. The jurisdiction is
among the oldest of the Court of Chancery (Aylesford v. Morris, L.R. 8 Ch.
App. 484, 489), and is certainly connected with the preservation of family
property (Twistleton v. Griffith, 1 P. Wms. 310), and the importance of pro-
tecting wealthy young heirs from ruining a patrimony before they feel the
force of family traditions. It has never been defined with much clearness, for
the language of Lord Hardwicke in Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr. 125,
155, 156, which seems to have been regarded as the best statement of the
doctrine, does not, with deference, define anything at all beyond saying that
there are circumstances short of deceit in which the court will regard one of
the parties as at a relative disadvantage to the other.
Id. at 109. Justice Hand rejected the policy behind the English cases:
We have no public concern for the preservation of family inheritances, and
ought, I believe, have no tenderness towards expectants of rich reversions. It
may be that the purchase of a remainder carries with it the burden of show-
ing that there was no exploitation of extreme need, no beguiling of youthful
heirs, and even that the ancestor consented, when there is one - a doctrine
very strange in American ears.
Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
Moreover, he had no sympathy for the parties involved:
Most important of all, he was already affluent; his income of $9,000 a year
not only provided for his necessities, but gave him much greater wealth than
of 99 men out of 100. I find it hard to have patience with the waterish senti-
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Looking at the unconscionability doctrine in the early 1940s, the best
that can be said is that courts of equity had the power to reform contracts
that were too one-sided and infected with what Professor Leff calls "bar-
gaining naughtiness" and the "infliction of serious hardship. ' 218 The
U.C.C. empowers a common-law judge, as well as a chancellor in equity,
to refuse to enforce a contract. However, with the merger of law and
equity under modern procedure, 219 this empowerment was unnecessary.
It does raise the doctrine from obscurity and place it in plain view in the
middle of Article 2. But Llewellyn had originally wanted to do something
different than give an old equitable doctrine a second chance at stardom.
His proposed section 1-C would have been the basis of a systematic regu-
lation of form contracts for the judge and merchant's jury.
VI. THE 1944 DRAFT
A. THE DRAFTING PROCESS
In 1944, there was an agreement between the ALI and the NCC to
draft the Code together. Llewellyn kept his strategic position in oversee-
ing the drafting, being given a free hand in the choice of the reporters and
advisory committees. His former pupil and research assistant, and soon-
to-be wife, Soia Mentschikoff, was chosen as Assistant Chief Reporter.220
Those he chose as draftsmen were mostly younger professors. We now
see such scholars as Grant Gilmore among the giants of commercial law;
but, at the time of the drafting, they were junior professors.221
ment which seeks to make such a man the court's ward, and to protect him
against the consequences of his own folly. If he is to have the enjoyment of
great wealth, let him share its responsibility.
Id.
There is no evidence that Llewellyn had ever been aware of Hand's opinion in Provi-
dent; yet it is interesting that the classic case on unconscionability had been rejected by one
of New York's and the nation's leading judges.
218. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 539.
219. See e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
220. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 283.
221. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in
Codification, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 143 (1951).
The real work of drafting and criticism is done by the smaller group of
draftsmen and advisers under the direction of Professor Karl N. Llewellyn
who has much experience in this type of work. It is upon their shoulders that
the greater burden of creating a workable code must necessarily fall. In set-
ting up this inner organization the plan of the American Law Institute, with
only slight changes, has been adopted.
The eight or more draftsmen who are creating the Code, as set out in an
earlier draft, all seem to be people who are or at some time have been law
teachers. At the time of their appointment three had held full professor-
ships, the rest were of lower academic rank. Five of the ten articles of the
Code seem to have been in the direct charge of Professor Llewellyn and the
remainder were drafted by the other seven under his supervision.
Id. at 143 (citations omitted). Gilmore suggested that Llewellyn had picked Prosser, who
had no experience in negotiable instruments, to draft Article 3, in order to keep control of
the drafting process. See Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980), in
Donald Rapson, Book Review, 41 Bus. LAW. 675, 676 n.4 (1986).
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In order to understand the drafting process, we have to step back to see
what was and was not happening while the Code was being drafted. To a
great extent, one has to infer the political processes involved from the
objective changes in the drafts because no official record was kept of the
oral negotiations on the provisions. 222 World War II and the start of the
Cold War captivated the country. Obviously, the nation's attention was
not going to be focused on a long-term process of revising commercial
law.223 Interested parties such as the American Bankers Association
would be anxious to participate, but no one else. Moreover, there were
no organized consumer groups in this era to counteract the business
groups that would be affected by the U.C.C.224 A 1943 memorandum
describing an interview with John Wilson reveals the political milieu sur-
rounding the U.C.C.'s drafting:
Wilson stated he was on the boards of the General Electric Com-
pany, International Harvester Company and The Marshall Field Cor-
poration. He thought, emphasizing the first two, that there might be
a reasonable possibility of a donation from those corporations pro-
vided the matter could be presented to them as something which
would benefit the business of the corporations. 225
A document from 1942 reveals that William Draper Lewis, President of
the ALl, was seeking support from big business, banking, and large law
firms. 226 It notes that possible sources include the First National Bank of
Boston, the Chase National Bank, the Rockefeller Foundation, the
American Bankers Association, and the Investment Bankers Associa-
tion.227 The AL was also considering approaching forty of the larger law
firms of the United States for similar contributions. 228
The records of the drafting process reveal various meetings, travel, pro-
posals, and counterproposals. The correspondence in the Llewellyn pa-
pers reminds us that the drafters were human. The letters tell of colds,
flus, broken limbs, and long train trips to meeting sites. The routine de-
tails of committee work had to be addressed. 229
222. See TwINING, supra note 3, at 458 n.6.
223. Llewellyn noted this in 1944 in an unpublished manuscript, stating that "[tihe war
has cut off most of the general discussion in the law reviews which had been hoped for and
invited." History of the Uniform Revised Sales Act (1944), microformed on Karl N. Llew-
ellyn Papers J.V.2.k. (on file with SMU Law Review).
224. See TwINING, supra note 3, at 292.
225. The American Law Institute Commercial Code Project (Dec. 7, 1943),
microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.V.1.h. (on file with SMU Law Review).
226. See Notes of William Draper Lewis on William A. Schnader's Suggested Draft
Letter in Resecuring Funds, ALI Archives (June 1, 1942) (on file with SMU Law Review).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. For example, Herbert F. Goodrich, Assistant Director of the ALl, wrote to Miss
Soia Mentschikoff on December 9, 1946, attempting to set up a time and place to eat lunch
in New York: "I don't like to seem so fussy over this small matter, but I don't want good
conference time licked up in longer luncheon periods than we have to take. Midtown in
New York is pretty terrible these days." Letter from Herbert F. Goodnich to Soia Ment-
schikoff, ALI Archives (Dec. 9, 1946) (on file with SMU Law Review).
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Early documents also reveal that the drafters did not realize the enor-
mity of the task they had undertaken. In 1942, Llewellyn wrote to Wil-
liam Draper Lewis that the NCC had "hit on the device of a
Congressional Act, to coverage [sic] interstate and international com-
merce. The Conference foresaw that a Congressional Act would come
close to forcing adoption of a parallel act by the States-and very speed-
ily."'230 Also in 1942, a "Time Schedule" estimated that the Code would
be completed by 1946.231 In 1943, Lewis expressed surprise that it had
taken $15,000 to complete the Sales Act, stating that "not one of us had
any idea that to get the matter into proper shape Karl would have to have
not only an assistant like Colgan but a person of the experience and abil-
ity of Miss Mentschikoff. '232
Drafting the Code was hard work. It took much more time, money,
and effort than expected; an outcome that left the drafters in a bind.
They could hold out for principle or they could make the compromises
necessary for the Code's adoption. A participant at the AL meeting of
1950 queried: "[t]he question is, are we going to have a Code or aren't
we? We have run out of money. We have spent ten years on this Sales
Act. '233 It may be also that Llewellyn's disdain for pure intellectualism
in favor of "action-directive thinking" made it necessary for him to try to
make a difference in the commercial and political world rather than to
undertake pure scholarship. The circumstances forced compromise for
the sake of enactment.
The drafting process took place virtually unnoticed, with no significant
articles commenting on it from 1944 through 1947. For example, in 1947,
the Business Lawyer gave just a general description of the proposed
Code.234 There was no sustained, systematic, or critical academic com-
mentary on the proposed Code. There are many articles devoted to the
U.C.C. in the forties and early fifties, but almost all are short descriptive
pieces.235 A survey of four law reviews (New York University, Columbia,
Yale, and Harvard) for the years 1948, 1952, and 1955, reveals only eight
articles about commercial law. Commercial law was apparently not a
topic of academic concern during the era of the Code's drafting.236
The NCC's limited success up to that date in having its proposals en-
acted may have played a significant role in the lack of attention paid to
the drafters. Professor Twining reports that it had taken at least ten years
230. Letter from Karl N. Llewellyn to William Draper Lewis, ALI Archives (Jan. 27,
1942) (on file with SMU Law Review).
231. See Commercial Law/Time Schedule, ALI Archives (1942) (on file with SMU Law
Review).
232. Letter from William Draper Lewis to William A. Schnader, ALI Archives (Mar.
25, 1943) (on file with SMU Law Review).
233. JUDGE MILLER, CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 183 (May 18, 1950).
234. See William A. Beers, The New Commercial Code, 2 Bus. LAW. 14 (1947).
235. See e.g., Allison Dunham, The New Commercial Code, 55 COM. L.J. 197 (1950).




between the promulgation of an act and its adoption by a majority of
states.237 In retrospect, it seems that people should have paid more atten-
tion to what would become the basis of American, as well as interna-
tional, commercial law, yet the Code's overwhelming success could not
have been predicted at the time.238
Another reason for the lack of interest in the drafts was that informa-
tion about the Code was hard to get. Of course the Code was drafted at a
time before copy machines, faxes, and the internet. It was much more
expensive in the 1940s to duplicate and send drafts than it is today. In the
late 1940s, the word processing system of the ALI was Eleanor Twonig,
who cut the stencils for the mimeograph reproduction of the Code. 239
Much of the ALl archives are taken up with correspondence from people
requesting copies of the Code. For example, on January 31, 1947, William
Draper Lewis wrote to Merton L. Ferson of the University of Cincinnati
College of Law, stating that no current draft of the Sales Act was avail-
able, but that he was sending a copy of the 1944 Draft.240 Lewis wrote,
"Please return it to me when you are through with it as this is one of my
four remaining copies. '241 The physical copies were simply not available
for comment.
The times, the political situation, and the lower status of commercial
law among academics resulted in a Code that was drafted in isolated, ob-
scure circumstances. Thus, major decisions affecting how people live
their everyday economic lives were made with hardly anyone paying
attention.
B. THE 1944 DRAFT
The 1944 Draft dropped both the mercantile performance standard for
the rejection of goods and the merchants tribunal.2 42 With the demise of
mercantile performance and the merchant tribunal, the strength of trade
norms lessened, as did the power of merchants to decide issues of com-
mercial law. The Code was created as a system of traditional judicial in-
237. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 273.
238. Although by 1940 seven major uniform acts had been adopted by a substantial
majority of American jurisdictions, and in some cases by all of them, the adoption process
was extremely slow and laborious. For instance, no less than ten years had ever passed
between the date of promulgation of an act and its adoption by a majority of the states; in
fact, it had taken forty-seven years to secure every jurisdiction's enactment of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, which was promulgated in 1909, and after fifty years only thirty-four
states had enacted the Uniform Sales Act. Further difficulties arose when amendments
were proposed. For example, although all jurisdictions enacted the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, even as late as 1958, only sixteen had adopted the amendments proposed by
the conference in 1922. See id.
239. See Letter to Eleanor A. Twonig, Secretary, ALl Archives (Jan. 20, 1948) (on file
with SMU Law Review).
240. See Letter from William Draper Lewis to Merton L. Ferson, ALI Archives (Jan.
31, 1947) (on file with SMU Law Review).
241. Id.
242. See Uniform Revised Sales Act § 91 (Proposed Final Draft 1944), reprinted in 2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRAFTS (Elizabeth Kelly ed., 1984) [hereinafter Proposed Final
Draft 1944].
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terpretation of contract language, rather than one of interpretation by
merchants. Merchants felt that relaxing the standard of strict perform-
ance would open them up to sales of non-conforming goods. Thus, the
modern Code returns to the strict compliance standard for non-install-
ment contracts. 243 The Conference Reports reveal that the drafters
doubted the constitutionality of the merchants tribunal as well as to its
workability.244 Hiram Thomas questioned the basis of Llewellyn's faith
in the impartial expert, stating that in real life one could get an expert to
testify as to anything.245 Moreover, Schrader doubted whether the pro-
posal would be politically feasible. 246
Thomas had specific criticism of the proposed merchant tribunals as
well. First, Llewellyn's proposal did not provide for cross-examination,
which was necessary because opposing experts frequently gave contradic-
tory testimony. Thomas said, "[y]ou come to cross-examine a witness
who testifies to a usage and very often there is no usage. He believes
there is because in his particular firm they follow it, but when the evi-
dence is all in, there isn't any usage. '247 Here Thomas was striking at the
core belief of the Realist faith; the belief that there was an objective real-
ity that could be readily ascertained. If experts could be found to testify
to anything, then the use of merchants tribunals to fix trade custom would
be futile.
Moreover, Thomas thought that the use of the merchants tribunal
would violate the constitutional right to a jury trial.248 A Mr. Lane
agreed, stating that "[t]he jury system is so fastened upon all our state
constitutions that I think it would be impossible to amend those constitu-
tions within ten years or maybe more .... -249 In the discussion, Presi-
dent Schnader indicated he thought that this procedural innovation had
no place in a commercial code.250 Furthermore, he felt it would cause a
delay in adoption because the political support was not there:
Then the second thing about which I would like to hear the frank
views of the members of this conference is, in how many of their
states do they think that an act could be passed which contained this
procedure? I suspect that in forty-five out of forty-eight states this
procedure would mean a delay of possibly ten years in getting the
sales act passed. I think a great deal of educational work must be
done before even the members of the Bar would advocate a proce-
dure of this sort. Now it may be that if the prominent merchants
243. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1996). Handwritten annotations to Llewellyn's copy of the
1941 draft show that the substantial performance standard was criticized as too general, not
sufficiently predictable, and encouraging of chiseling by unscrupulous sellers. See George
L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the U. C.C.:
An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 971 n.27 (1975).
244. See 52d Annual NCC Conference, supra note 181, at 131.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 136.
247. Id. at 131.
248. See id. at 132-33.
249. Id. at 137.
250. See id. at 136.
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associations, trade associations, were all behind it and for it and de-
manded it, that would change the picture, but I doubt whether that
situation exists. I certainly think that we ought not to wrap up in one
package a procedural reform, however good, with the substantive
law of sales and the other subjects which go into a commercial
code.251
The merchants tribunal sections were dropped and with them went a
large part of Llewellyn's proposed system of commercial law. The U.C.C.
terms "usage of trade," "commercially reasonable," and "merchantable"
were originally to be determined by merchants, not by judges or lay ju-
ries. The fixing of the merchant norms that were to control commercial
dealing was to be done by merchants themselves. The power of
merchants was decreased, thus increasing the power of lawyers, judges,
and lay jurors.
Professor Whitman points out that while the merchants tribunal sec-
tions were dropped, a host of provisions that were to be decided by the
tribunals were not:
But when the commissioners abandoned Section 59, they did not
abandon a host of provisions that assumed the institutional frame-
work of Section 59. Llewellyn's Code retained its deference to "cus-
tom," the "law merchant," "good faith" and "reasonableness." In
Llewellyn's Romantic vocabulary, however, "custom," the "law
merchant," "good faith" and "reasonableness" were not terms of
substantive law, but procedural directives, indications to a court that
it should refer its decision to lay specialists with a feel for commer-
cial law.252
Whitman concludes that though the provisions on reasonableness origi-
nally assumed that "merchant juries would be available to develop a case-
law of 'reasonableness,"' the absence of such juries has caused courts to
flounder. 253 This "reasonableness" has become a major source of non-
uniformity in the application of the Code, while the determination of cus-
tom and usage has presented complex hearsay and burden of proof
problems, and the "law merchant" has become a dead letter. "Lacking
merchant juries, commercial courts must work with a mystical language
disengaged from the institutions that would have given it meaning. '254
By December of 1944, however, Llewellyn had not given up hope on his
merchants tribunal. In Plans for Uniform Commercial Code, he hoped
for "[a] companion Act setting up a commercial tribunal or procedure for
handling questions of commercial fact, which may have to be left out of
the Code because of the jury-provisions of the various constitutions, and
which may in any event be politically impracticable. '255
251. Id.
252. James Whitman, Commercial Law and The American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's
German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 174 (1987).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 175.
255. Plans for a Uniform Commercial Code, at 2 (1944), microformed on Karl N. Llew-
ellyn Papers J.VI.1.e. (on file with SMU Law Review).
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Other provisions downplayed the enforcement of merchant norms and
increased the power of individual contracting. The 1944 clause dealing
with form contracts was much reduced from the earlier proposed section
1-C. Section 23 of the 1944 draft stated that one who signs a form con-
tract is bound unless the writing in its entirety is unconscionable:
A party who signs or accepts a writing evidencing a contract for sale
which contains or incorporates one or more form clauses presented
by the other party is bound by them unless the writing in its entirety
including the form clauses is an unconscionable contract. A contract
rendered unconscionable by form clauses shall be subject to
reformation.2 56
A prior confidential draft of the same clause contained language limit-
ing a merchant's rights and explicitly mentioned equity:
A party who signs or accepts a writing evidencing a contract for sale
which contains or incorporates one or more form clauses presented
by the other party is bound by them unless the writing in its entirety
including the form clauses is an unconscionable contract, except that
a merchant who signs and returns such a writing after having had a
reasonable time to read it is bound by it. A contract rendered un-
conscionable by form clauses shall be subject to reformation in
equity.2 57
In the NCC's consideration of the Sales Act in 1943, Llewellyn had
asked for the sense of the committee:
We think that there is general agreement through the house that
unconscionable form clauses or sets of form clauses are good things
to keep from operation. Have I caught the sense of the house in
that? Very well. I see no objection to that one.
We believe, secondly, that the mere incorporation of form clauses
in your opinion can be an extremely useful thing when they are bal-
anced and decent sets of forms that help adjust the law to the partic-
ular deal. Am I right on that one? I seem to be right on that one.2 58
Also in 1943, Llewellyn sketched out the comment for section 214
called Form Clauses, Conscionable and Unconscionable. His language
speaks of the
Old[er] rule that a man is bound by what he has signed derives
from the days when a written document represented a careful dicker
arrived at in leisure, and has no proper application to the situation in
hand. The fact is that a person signing such a form agrees, blind, to
any reasonable terms-or even, to any not unreasonable terms-
which may be found thereon. But he does not intend to sign a blank
check.
256. Proposed Final Draft 1944, supra note 242, § 23.
257. Sales Section (Sales Act) § 23, Council Draft No. 1 (Feb. 9, 1944), reprinted in
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS, supra note 74, at 274-75.
258. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Fifty-Third An-
nual Conference, at 230 (1943), microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.V.2.h. (on file
with SMU Law Review) [hereinafter 53d Annual NCC Conference].
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The Comment should show that since the rules of the Act are
drawn with a careful balance of the rights and needs of buyer and
seller, a form which cumulates too many departures from those rules
in material particulars, and in favor of one side only, begins to take
on the aspect of the unconscionable; and the obligation of good faith
implicit in all contracts for sale entitles a person signing a form to
expect that its contents will not unreasonably depart from a fair ad-
justment of rights and duties on the matters which were not particu-
larly discussed by the parties.259
The comments show the divergence between Llewellyn's concept of
"unconscionability" and the historical, equitable concept. He spoke in
terms of "balanced and decent sets of forms," not a situation that was
procedurally unconscionable or substantively a bad deal. He talks in
terms of a contract that was balanced and decent in rights and
responsibilities.
The 1944 Act gave more weight to contract terms, stating that "express
terms shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course
of dealing shall control usage of trade. '260 Commercial standards are
read into merchant dealings, however, by virtue of the requirement of
"good faith," which "in the case of a merchant includes reasonable obser-
vance of commercial standards"2 61 and section 26(2), which mandated:
"Every contract within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and one between merchants shall also be interpreted in ac-
cordance with commercial standards. '262 The 1944 Act, moreover, set
forth that "parties engaged in a particular vocation or trade are bound by
its usages. '263 The Act thus did not resolve the conflict between express
terms and commercial usage.
Avoiding the imposition of implied warranties was made easier by the
deletion of the prior section that prevented general disclaimers where a
reasonable person would rely on the merchantability and fitness of the
goods.264 The new sub-sections spelled out how to exclude warranties,
stating that
(a) all implied warranties are excluded by general language like
"as is," "as they stand,' ''with all faults" or other terms which in
common understanding call the buyer's attention to the exclusion of
warranties and make plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when before contracting the buyer has examined the goods or
the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine
the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which
259. Informal Appendix to Revised Uniform Act, Third Draft, 1943 Tentative Sketch of
Material for Comments, at 11-12, microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.V.2.d (on file
with SMU Law Review).
260. Proposed Final Draft 1944, supra note 242, § 21(4)(b).
261. Id. at § 10.
262. Id. at § 26(2).
263. Id. at § 21(3).
264. See R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 15(6).
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an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him;
and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.265
Section 43 extended warranties
to any natural person whose relationship to the buyer is such as to
make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person or property by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the opera-
tion of this section.266
The 1944 Act dropped the detailed section providing for products lia-
bility, but it did provide for a direct action and an impleader against a
prior seller for damages resulting from breach of warranty. 267 This provi-
sion was finally eliminated in the Proposed Final Draft Number 2 of
Spring 1951.268
A new section, called Breach in Installment Contracts, prescribed a
standard of substantial performance.269 Such performance, however, is
not defined in terms of mercantile performance as it was in the 1941 Act.
The sections on limitations of remedies270 were much less detailed than
the prior version. Now a sole remedy could be provided unless "circum-
stances cause it to fail of its essential purpose. ' 271 Limitations of reme-
dies to return of goods and replacement became presumptively valid,
except where such a limitation "deprives the buyer of the substantial
value of the goods .... "272 Generally, the specific detailed controls of
the 1941 Act were replaced by the vague term "reasonable." The prior
detailed rules regarding modification of remedies, for example, were con-
265. Proposed Final Draft 1944, supra note 242, § 41(2)(a)-(c). There was little case
precedent for the principle that "as is" should work to disclaim warranties. The few cases
that involved the term concerned such peculiar goods as forfeited merchandise and a used
tugboat. See, e.g., W.E. Hedger Co., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1931) (sale of
tugboat by U.S. Shipping Board); Dalton v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1941)
(sale of jewelry and watches seized by U.S. Customs); Montagne v. Bank for Sav. in N.Y.,
43 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (sale of building as "fireproof").
266. Proposed Final Draft 1944, supra note 242, § 43.
267. See id. §§ 120-21.
SECTION 120. IMPLEADER BY BUYER. A buyer sued for any breach against
which his seller has warranted to hold him harmless under section 40 may
implead his seller [in like manner and with like effect as is or may be pro-
vided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and any person so impleaded
may in turn implead his warrantor.
SECTION 121. DIRECT ACTION AGAINST PRIOR SELLER. Damages from
breach of a warranty sustained by the buyer or by any beneficiary to whom
the warranty extends under Section 43 may be recovered in a direct action
against the seller or any person subject to impleader under Section 120. An
action against one warrantor does not of itself bar action against another.
Id. §§ 120-21 (alteration in original).
268. See Uniform Commercial Code Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1951), microformed
on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.XIV.1.a (on file with SMU Law Review).
269. See id.
270. See id. §§ 122-24.
271. Id. § 122(2).
272. Id. § 123.
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densed and disclaimers made easier to include. 273 Consequential dam-
ages could be limited if the limitations were not "unconscionable. '274
The detailed proto-402A provision was changed into a simple provision
for a direct action.
Reviewing the 1944 Draft in the light of our four parameters (statutory
dictate, regulation, trade norms, and contract), we see a change from the
1941 Act. The power of trade norms over commerce was lessened by the
rejection of mercantile performance and the merchants jury. However,
the language that parties in a trade are bound by its usages reintroduced
control by trade norms; however, as does the requirement of good faith in
the Act, it was defined in terms of commercial standards.
Many of the earlier specific merchant rules were dropped in the 1944
Draft.2 75 Many provisions were generalized, having been made applica-
ble to non-merchants as well as merchants. For example, the recovery of
expenses section of the 1941 Draft for cover limited to merchants' recov-
ery of expenses that "are by mercantile usage reasonable" changed in
1944 to merely require "any commercially reasonable changes. '276 The
focus was taken off "mercantile usage" and was instead based on the
vaguer term "commercially reasonable. '2 77
A court could still regulate commercial dealings, but the standards
were made more vague. The substitution of "unconscionability" for the
objective standards of Proposed section 1-C and the 1941 Act's detailed
sections on limitation of remedies reduced the scope of the positive regu-
lation by the statutory commands of the 1941 Act. The parties were free
to make their own deal with only marginal judicial intervention.
VII. COMMERCIAL PAPER AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS
While Article 2 was being developed, Article 3 was also being drafted.
A key issue when drafting Article 3 was whether or not objective good
faith was to extend beyond Article 2. The 1946 Tentative Draft No. 1,
Article III defined "good faith" as meaning only "honesty in fact. '278
The Reporters and Chief Reporters had proposed in addition that good
faith should also include "'reasonable observance of the standards of any
business or trade in which the purchaser is engaged,"' but their proposal
was turned down. 279 The debate over whether to use objective or subjec-
tive good faith in Article 3 was to continue, with subjective finally to win
the day. Adopting the suggested language in Article 3 would have ex-
273. See id. at § 124.
274. Id. § 124(3).
275. See, e.g., R.U.S.A., 1941 Draft, supra note 2, § 3-6 (course of business and per-
formance relevant to acceptance of silence).
276. Proposed Final 1944 Draft, supra note 242, § 117.
277. See Wiseman, supra note 16, at 522-23, app. A at 542-45 (listing generalized
merchant rules).
278. Commercial Code Tentative Draft No. 1, Article III § 42, reprinted in 2 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 273 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
279. Id.
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tended Article 2's imposition of trade norms to the domain of negotiable
instruments. In the 1946 Draft, good faith with regard to investment in-
struments "in the case of a professional includes reasonable observance
of commercial standards. '280 In 1947's Article 3, good faith also "in-
cludes reasonable observance of the standards of any business or trade in
which the purchaser is engaged."'281 With a few minor changes, objective
standards of good faith were promulgated through the July 1948 ver-
sions.282 For the next four years, the action was in negotiable instru-
ments, bank collections, securities, foreign remittances, documents of
title, and secured transactions. There was not another official draft of
Article 2 until 1948.283
The history of the secured transactions article (formerly Article 6, now
Article 9) also shows a progression from a statute with detailed regulation
of commercial activity to one in which freedom of contract reigns. In the
lending context, with large financial institutions facing individual debtors,
freedom of contract between secured party and debtor means the secured
party prevails. Moreover, the point of a security interest is to affect other
parties (e.g., trade creditors, tort victims, employers) who have claims
against the debtor.
Today, the secured party and the security agreement are supreme. Sec-
tion 9-201 of the U.C.C. states that "except as otherwise provided by this
Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors. ' 284 The
"floating lien" is the most powerful security device by which the lender
can reach all the present and future assets of the debtor. However, this
unfettered supremacy was not the original intent of the drafters.
The story of modern secured transactions law begins, as does so much
of our present commercial, contract, and tort law, with an idea of Llewel-
lyn. He drafted two acts dealing with secured transactions, the Uniform
Chattel Mortgage Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.28 5 The first
was a total failure, never enacted by any state, but the second was a suc-
cess, enacted by several states after its approval by the NCC in 1933.286
Although the Trust Receipts Act's exact scope was impossible to ascer-
tain (Gilmore labels it "one of the world's most difficult statutes" 287), it
was intended to be restricted to purchase money loans for goods held for
280. Preliminary Tentative Draft No. 1, Article V § 20 (1946), reprinted in 3 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 1 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
281. Commercial Code Tentative Draft No. 2, Article III § 45 (1947), reprinted in 3
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 45 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
282. See Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Article III § 306 (1948), reprinted in 5 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRjrrs 1 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
283. See id.
284. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1989).





resale.288 It did not amount to a "floating lien."'289
A planning document entitled "Scope and General Plan," dated No-
vember 18, 1943, stated "[t]he Code plan, as thus far developed, looks to
the production of a comprehensive battery of security devices covering
every needed aspect of finance; but in general the plan looks to providing
only a single device to fill any particular type of need. '290
The Plan went on to propose a chattel mortgage on equipment that
"must be made capable of covering replacements of or additions to
equipment."'291 But this type of floating lien was not to extend to inven-
tory. The plan stated the provision of this end "must not be capable of
being turned to the mortgaging of a retailer's stock in trade. '292
In 1944, William Draper Lewis made notes on an interview with Karl
Llewellyn. Llewellyn sketched out the future drafting of the Code, put-
ting security interests into a section that would generate political
controversy.
BLOCK II: Chattel Security, worked into simpler and more auto-
matic format
Chattel mortgage on equipment, accompanying realty mortgage.
(No important political difficulty.)
Agricultural chattel mortgage. (No important political difficulty.)
[Extension of trust receipt idea into stock-in-trade generally.
(Political difficulty expected.)]
Single-type of purchase-money security; a modernized and exclu-
sive Conditional Sales Act. (Political difficulty certain.)
[Book account financing. (Political difficulty certain.)]
[Auto-title-certificates. (Political difficulty probable.)]
Other chattel mortgage limited to non-current finance. (Political
difficulty.)
[Commercial and banking phases of pledge. (Probably no impor-
tant political difficulty.)]
[A standard usuary law on all points but the interest rate, making
the needed exceptions and providing workable sanctions and criteria
for "masked usury." (Political difficulty; and the overlap into the
"small" loan field has, in practice, already occurred.)] 293
The idea of a purchase money lien embodied in the trust receipt was
thus extended into general inventory financing. The note about "a stan-
dard usury law" indicated a thought about consumer protection legisla-
tion being incorporated into the proposed secured transaction article. In
288. See id. at 106.
289. Id. at 124-25.
290. Karl N. Llewellyn, Document B: Scope and General Plan Uniform Commercial
Code, Scope and General Plan, at 4 (Nov. 18, 1943), microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn
Papers J.V.l.e (on file with SMU Law Review).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2.
293. Memorandum from William Draper Lewis to William A. Schnader and Herbert F.
Goodrich, ALI Archives (June 13, 1944) (on file with SMU Law Review) (alterations in
original).
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1947, however, Llewellyn still referred to the floating lien as applicable to
"industrial machinery. '294 The drafters had not yet come up with the uni-
tary Article 9 security device that can attach to all the debtor's present
and future collateral.
VIII. THE GENERAL COMMENT
A. DESCRIPTION
During this time (1944-48), there was a set of explanatory materials,
labelled "Introductory Comments or General Comment on Parts II and
III" (the "General Comment"), which never made it into the official
drafts. 295 In the materials, Llewellyn described what he thought the Code
accomplished. The General Comment did not change in any material re-
spect from 1944 to 1948, although it was fleshed out with more annota-
tions and underwent some language changes. It was never adopted in
toto; however, parts were incorporated into the comments for individual
sections. The cases now listed in the Comments to section 2-302,296 for
example, derive from footnote 7 of the General Comment.
297
The 1944 Act explicitly provided that the General Comment and the
comments to specific sections could be consulted "to determine the un-
derlying reasons, purposes and policies of this Act."'298 The 1944 Draft is
accompanied by some 187 pages of comments, indicating that the early
sections were supposed to be read in conjunction with a voluminous
commentary.
In the General Comment, Llewellyn sets out the basic principles be-
hind the formation and construction of commercial contracts under the
U.C.C. These basic principles are "good faith, the elimination of surprise
and technical traps, and the interpretation of all phases of the formation
and performance of the contract in the light of reasonable behavior under
the existing circumstances. ' 299  The three principles have to be under-
stood in terms of commerce: "[wihen the parties to a sales contract are
commercial men, the reasonable meaning of either language or actions in
the commercial circumstances, and commercial good faith calls for obser-
294. Llewellyn thought that in the latter case, an industrial loan with industrial machin-
ery as security, it was possible to devise a method whereby individual chattels and other
items given as security need not be separately designated and a record kept for each by
filing. See Minutes of Joint Editorial Board, at 3 (Nov. 1, 1947), microformed on Karl N.
Llewellyn Papers J.IX.3.d (on file with SMU Law Review).
295. See e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Introductory Comment to Parts II and III Formation and
Construction, microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.VI.2.h. (on file with SMU Law
Review).
296. See U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1 (1989).
297. See Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 19.
298. Proposed Final Draft 1944, supra note 242, § 1(2). Sustained effort has been made
to make the reason and purpose apparent either on the face of the text or in the Com-
ments, and the court is expressly authorized to consult the Comments. The Comments
therefore acquire a status equivalent to that of a Committee Report on the basis of which a
proposed bill has been enacted by a legislature. The section adopts as the sound construc-
tion of the Act the well-established. See id. § 1 (cmt.).
299. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55.
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vance of commercial standards by men of commerce. '300
Treating the forty-one page General Comment as a whole, the specific
concerns previously expressed in the withdrawn section 1-C have been
made applicable to the entire Sales Article. Although the scope of sec-
tion 1-C was narrowed to cover only invalidating unconscionable con-
tracts, that section's emphasis of such trade and its limitation on a party's
freedom to contract out of Code provisions and trade norms is now ap-
plied by the General Comment to the Sales Article as a whole. The Gen-
eral Comment mandated that any explicit terms of the contract must be
read in terms of the usages of trade, the circumstances of the parties, and
the principles of equality.30 1 Analyzing the General Comment in terms
of our four parameters (individual bargaining, trade norms, statutory dic-
tates, and administrative regulation), we can see that Llewellyn, despite
the criticism of Hiram Thomas that he neglected fundamental principles
of contract law, still de-emphasized the parties' bargain.
Section 2 of the General Comment stated "Explicit dickered terms are
the foundation of the contract. Usage of trade read into explicit terms.
This Act accepts as of course the general law under which the parties
control the terms of the contract (always subject to qualifications based
on public policy). ' 302 This recognition of explicit terms was only put in,
however, after Thomas protested that the General Comment ignored ba-
sic principles of contract law. He remarked, "I got this impression that
really what is written in the contract even the dickered terms do not
amount to much but the emphasis upon the variation by usage and cause
of dealing. '303 Llewellyn agreed: "We agree with Mr. Thomas's sugges-
tion that there be inserted as a paragraph 2 in the technical comment on
Parts II and III a paragraph dealing with the importance of the dickered
language. '30 4 But this privileging of the parties' language was quickly
qualified by the General Comment; "First, then, words are used which
must be read as they are understood in the trade. Whatever their mean-
ing in the trade is the meaning which the agreement incorporates either
between merchants or as against a merchant. '30 5 Trade usages may be
localized. For example, a footnote refers to a case that adopted the local
usages of Philadelphia.30 6 After discussing the strict construction of over-
seas documentary shipment contracts, 30 7 section 4 discusses the broader
principles of construction that should be applied to all other sales
contracts. 308
300. Id.
301. See id. at 1, 35-40.
302. Id. at 4.
303. Karl Llewellyn, Joint Advisory Committee Meeting, at 1 (May 21-22, 1945),
microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.VII.2.a (on file with SMU Law Review).
304. Id. at 2.
305. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 5.
306. See id. at 6 n.2.
307. See id. at 6-7.
308. See id. at 8-10.
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Section 6 dealt with "[c]ontracting out of trade usage, course of dealing
or the interpretation indicated by the circumstances of the case: Avoid-
ance of surprise. '309 It stresses the parties' course of dealing and the "cir-
cumstances of the case as in usage of trade. '310 The circumstances will
dictate what is reasonable or may add to the explicit terms, as in the crea-
tion of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 311
Llewellyn noted that section 21 then provided that express terms con-
trol usage and course of dealing. But "express terms shall dominate only
when such construction is reasonable. ' 31 2 Llewellyn here reiterated the
principle of section 1-C-that variation from trade usage must be explic-
itly flagged and thus brought to the other party's attention. 313 "Surprise"
is to be prevented. Surprise is defined in terms of unexpected deviation
from trade usage. "Therefore, attention must be called to a desire to con-
tract at material variance from the accepted commercial pattern of contract
or use of language. Thus, this Act rejects any 'surprise' variation from the
fair and normal meaning of the agreement. '314
Section 7 reiterated section 1-C's division of explicit terms into two
types: those "consciously dickered out by the parties" and "those clauses
contained in a form or inserted by one party in a lengthy contract which
the parties never consciously bargain out and to which the attention of
the other party is never directed. ' 315 Form clauses, however, can make
commercial sense. Thus, the rule of "construction most strongly against
the party preparing the document" may work against commercially rea-
sonable clauses. 316 Under the Act, "the test of reasonableness in such
cases is consonance with the general commercial background or with the
perceptible commercial needs of the particular trade or case. ' 317 Clauses
that deviate from trade norms are suspect; "[b]ut when a clause or set of
clauses is so unfair or so one-sided that it is not to be expected either
between decent merchants or from a decent dealer, their contents enter
by surprise. '318
The section on unconscionability319 came between the section on rea-
sonable construction and the section entitled "9. Avoiding surprise, in
practice, where terms are varied from the expected background.' 320 Thus
Llewellyn continued to see the concept of unconscionability in terms of
deviance from trade practice rather than in terms of its traditional equity
sense of quasi-fraud, which Professor Leff calls "one-clause
309. Id. at 12.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 12-13.
312. Id. at 13-14.
313. See id. at 14.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 15.
316. Id. at 16-17.
317. Id. at 18.
318. Id.
319. See id. § 8, at 19-21.




Under the heading Unconscionability, Llewellyn pointed out that
courts have dealt with "unfair surprise clauses" by various means:
8. Unconscionability. Frequently, the courts have adopted other
lines of approach to this same problem of unfair surprise clauses.
They have called upon the rule against trick, artifice or stratagem,
have eviscerated the unfair clause by adverse construction, have
manipulated the rules of offer and acceptance to keep the clauses
out, or have knocked it out as contrary to public policy or to the
dominant essence of the contract. 322
Here, Llewellyn appended the famous list of exemplary cases that are
now included in the comment to section 2-302. Professor Leff points out
that these cases are a strange bunch. None are later than 1937, and gen-
erally deal with warranty disclaimers. 32 3 Llewellyn saw these cases as
"based upon a single principle: they deliberately disregard or miscon-
strue the language of one party in order to make effective the actual bar-
gain made by both parties, eliminating as unconscionable those elements
which rest on unfair surprise. '324 This makes the jurisprudential point
that the "diversity of reasoning" of the cases has prevented the creation
of "consistent and accessible lines of guidance for the draftsman or the
court which has led to much unnecessary litigation. '325 Llewellyn saw the
unconscionability section as providing an explicit mechanism for striking
out unconscionable clauses. The General Comment stated that uncon-
scionability can be found in the "pure content of a clause or set of clauses
as applied to a given situation" and also "in the combination of an unfair
(although less extreme) clause or set of clauses with the element of
surprise. '326
Llewellyn frequently used this jurisprudential justification to defend
the unconscionability section. To the accusations that the sections would
allow courts to rewrite contracts, he answered that courts did it anyway,
but they did it surreptitiously. The unconscionability section allowed
them to rewrite contracts openly and to create a body of precedent. For
example, in a 1943 committee meeting, a participant objected to the form
contract section:
MR. IMLAY: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we have between our-
selves and the Committee a definite understanding as to what we are
trying to do. I have been assuming that this codification in the law of
sales is based upon a common legislative experience and something
of a common judicial interpretation. I may be wrong in that assump-
tion, but if I am right in that assumption, it seems to me that this
section 24 will revolutionize the whole common law of contracts in
321. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 513.
322. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 19.
323. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 526 n.155.
324. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 20.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 21.
[Vol. 51
HISTORY OF THE U.C.C.
all the states, and it will put in the hands of an individual judge the
determination of what is and what is not a conscionable contracting
every case. The form of contract, the printed form, is very common,
I suppose universally used in the sale of goods.
Now wherever that form is used and furnished by the seller or the
buyer, as the case may be, and is signed by the other party, then it
becomes open for the judge to say whether the other party has
bound himself to something that is conscionable or unconscionable,
and would this not, in addition to upsetting the common law of con-
tract as we generally understand it, would it not be the most produc-
tive means of litigation that you could imagine? 32 7
Llewellyn replied:
The courts apart from the actual resort that they have made from
time to time to a touch of strong-arming by saying it is perfectly obvi-
ous that this deal wasn't read or was put over, they have indulged in
extremely interesting "construction" by a technic which if I were not
speaking for the record, I might call high-powered and rather beauti-
ful technic of misconstruction in the interests of justice.328
His reference to the list of cases now found in section 2-302's comment
illustrated the various ways courts deal with unfair surprise clauses. Pro-
fessor Leff points out that all these cases (except one) involved form
clauses.329 This is not surprising because we know that Llewellyn was
concerned with form contracts at least since the writing of his casebook in
1930. The unconscionability clause was limited to form contracts until
1948.330 Leff states, "if these cases show the way, any form contract is up
for grabs under 2-302."331 The rest of the General Comment indicates
that this may well have been Llewellyn's original intent.
The General Comment went on to discuss "[a]voiding surprise, in prac-
tice, when the terms are varied from the expected background. ' 332 Llew-
ellyn pointed out that the trade or the circumstances can require a
particular interpretation, for example, in a contract for precision parts.
Where it was not "entirely clear to both parties that performance above
and beyond the usual commercial pattern will be necessary, attention
must be called to that fact. ' 333 Thus, in Llewellyn's view, standard prac-
327. Consideration in Committee of the Whole of the Revised Uniform Sales Act, at 72
(Aug. 18-21, 1943), microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.V.2.h. (on file with SMU
Law Review).
328. Id.
329. Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 502.
330. See id. at 494-95.
331. Id. at 504.
332. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 21. Llewellyn assumes that busi-
nessmen expect the non-dickered language to be fair and not deviate too much from trade
norms. Professor Leff contradicts this assumption:
Let me submit an alternative possibility: most businessmen, insofar as they
think about the question at all, expect that the other party's form will be the
same kind of form which they had their lawyers draft for them, that is, a form
which attempts to take everything for the owner of the pad.
Leff, The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 179, at 506-07.
333. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 21-22.
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tices of merchants could not be varied by the parties except by circum-
stances or express "specially dickered portions of the agreement. '334
The next two sections of the General Comment discussed how a com-
mercial contract should be interpreted in light of course of dealing,
course of performance, and waiver. Llewellyn emphasized "[tihe flexible
character of commercial contracts.'335 These principles of contract inter-
pretation survived the drafting and enactment process and can be found
in the modern Code. 336 Together they make up a contractual system that
is based on the model of a longer term relationship between the parties
rather than one of single transactions. 337 As Llewellyn stated:
Actually most commercial obligations have a flexible character
which our legal vocabulary has had some trouble in grasping but
which has always been reflected in the spirit of the better commercial
cases. They represent a going relationship not rigidly defined at the
moment of contracting but changing in shape and structure in the
process of performance or of getting ready to perform or to fit super-
vening circumstances. 338
B. THE GENERAL COMMENT AND ECONOMICS
The last section of the General Comment dealt with incorporating us-
ages developed by trade associations into the agreement. Llewellyn
started by stating that now, practices have to change to meet new condi-
tions. "These are days in which the usage of various lines of trade is fre-
quently forced to reshape itself rapidly in order to fit new conditions. '339
Note that to Llewellyn, it is the trade, not the trader, that evolves new
trade practices in response to new conditions.
Llewellyn contrasted "balanced and reasonable" codified usages with
the "unbalanced and unreasonable usages. '340 He found that under this
Act "it is recognized that a balanced reasonable set of provisions of this
kind 'makes law' for the members and refines the more general rules of
this Act to meet effectively the specialized needs of a particular commod-
ity and a particular organization of the market."' 341 Later in the General
Comment, Llewellyn stated that the court can look to the origin of the
rules to determine "whether a set of standard provisions call for sympa-
thetic and expansive application or for a hostile attitude. '342 The court
should look to whether or not the rules are the product of equal
bargaining:
334. Id. at 22.
335. Id. § 10, at 24.
336. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208, 2-209 (1989).
337. See generally Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blastphemy and Irony in Con-
tract Theories, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 132 (1995).
338. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 24.
339. Id. at 35-38.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 36-37.
342. Id. at 38.
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Where, as in the dried fruit contracts or the lumber usages, both
sides have been effectively represented in the building of the "codifi-
cation," the results are rarely unbalanced, and what may seem to be
queer provisions to the outsider usually have a fair and good reason
within the particular trade. In most cases, indeed, the balance in
standard terms thus arrived at shows on their face.343
Here, Llewellyn applied the institutional economists' position that
equal bargaining produces fair, reasonable, and valid relationships be-
tween the parties to a bargain. Robert Hale's Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty344 appeared in 1943 and argued that more equality in
bargaining could lead to more freedom of contract. He claimed that "by
judicious legal limitation on the bargaining power of the economically
and legally stronger, it is conceivable that the economically weak would
acquire greater freedom of contract than they now have-freedom to re-
sist more effectively the bargaining power of the strong, and to obtain
better terms. '345
According to the General Comment, how the contract terms were bar-
gained for has one index of their validity; the other was "the provisions of
this Act itself. '346 Their "prime characteristic is a balanced adjustment of
the rights and interests of both the buyer and the seller. '347 It would be
permissible to modify provisions of the Act "as circumstances of the trade
or of the parties may seem to require. But cumulative modifications in a
single direction raise the suspicion that what they are seeking is not an
adjustment of the deal to the needs of the trade or of the particular situa-
tion, but rather an overreaching by one party to the contract. '348 Thus,
imbalanced contracts that met particular circumstances were all right but
overreaching by one party is not. If one party is getting a better deal than
the other, there is cause for a "hostile attitude" on the part of the courts.
Here, Llewellyn gave objective guides: (1) the contract term's devia-
tion from the Act's provisions; and (2) the bargaining process that pro-
duced them. Using the two guides, courts could police contracts in more
instances than they could under the equitable doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity, which only operates at the extremes. Additionally, the guides were
objective, unlike the unconscionability doctrine's subjective test of shock-
ing the conscience.
In the last sections of the General Comment, Llewellyn confessed that
the favoring of balanced trade agreements, arrived at through a process
of equal bargaining, could not be enacted through legislation. Llewellyn
343. Id. at 39-40.
344. See Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
603 (1943).
345. Id. at 628. Llewellyn cites Hale's classic Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. ScI. Q. 470 (1923), in Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 50, at
706 n.8. Llewellyn also attended a seminar with Hale on business organization in 1924-25.
See SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 3, at 16.
346. Llewellyn, General Comment, supra note 55, at 38.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 39.
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recognized that there was no effective way of drafting a statute that
would realize this goal. This may have been the moment when Llewellyn,
like Wile E. Coyote, looked down and realized that he had run off the
cliff. Although Llewellyn maintained that a court should enforce trade
norms and balanced agreements and not enforce unbalanced ones that
deviate too far from trade norms, he could not point to any supportive
statutory language. The drafting committees had rejected the merchants'
tribunal, many of the merchant rules, the detailed regulations for form
contracts, and the limitations on remedies. Doctrines based on the goals
of institutional economics-the prevention of chiseling, enforcement of
group norms of trade, and equal bargaining power-were replaced by
that of unconscionability and its equitable history of protecting the vul-
nerable. The U.C.C. was sliding out from under him, but Llewellyn con-
tinued to draft his General Comment as if the 1941 version of the Revised
Sales Act was still on the table.
IX. 1946-1948
The years 1946-1948 were relatively quiet. The drafters were evidently
at work on the 1949 codification of the articles for the proposed Code.
The lack of significant law review commentary continued during this pe-
riod. However, there were developments in two areas: (1) the 1948 Code
discarded the restriction that unconscionability applied only to form con-
tracts, and (2) sections dealing with consumer protection and general
creditor protection appeared in the secured transactions article.
In proposing consumer protection, the drafters may have felt them-
selves in tune with the times. Grant Gilmore, in his On the Difficulties of
Codifying Commercial Law, 349 concluded by observing that government
intervention, regulation, and supervision were growing:
Although the political weather is doubtful, nothing is less likely
than that the future will see a protracted period of unregulated pri-
vate agreement.
Here again there is little the draftsman can do except exercise cau-
tion and walk warily. What is certain is that a 19th century laissez-
faire code, or a code drafted with such an underlying bias, will be far
from adequate in an economy which has scrapped laissez-faire
principles.350
A. REGULATION OF SECURED LENDING: THE TENTATIVE PROPOSALS
The first draft dealing with secured transactions was the proposed Arti-
cle VI discussed at the meeting of January 30-February 1, 1948. Dealing
with "Consumer Mortgages," it provided for self-help repossession and
for preserving claims and defenses of the consumer against the secured
349. Gilmore, Difficulties, supra note 14, at 1341.
350. Id. at 1358.
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party.351 The Code's position on these two issues changed in subsequent
drafts. Today, the U.C.C. allows self-help repossession without notice 352
and allows a consumer's claims and defenses against the secured party to
be cut off.353 The Federal Trade Commission, however, has preserved by
regulation any consumer claims and defenses from being invalidated by a
security agreement. 354 For example, a buyer of a car can enforce any
warranty claims against most financers of the car purchase.
Part III of the proposed Article VI provided for "Mortgages on Cur-
rent Working Assets." It protected non-secured creditors by allowing ju-
dicial lienholders to preempt the secured party if no steps were taken
within ten days after the levy.355 The subsequent August 1948 draft, how-
ever, subjected a judicial lienholder to a "general inventory lien. '356
The Tentative Draft No. 2 of Article VII (now Article 9) of August
1948 also included a provision that sought to protect creditors from over-
reaching inventory financers. It provided the secured party with a float-
ing lien that could "take control of the inventory with consent of the
borrower and proceed as an agent authorized to take possession of or to
liquidate the inventory for benefit of the creditors. '357 The draft sub-
jected the financer to liability if he did not notify creditors and act with
the approval of a creditor's committee. 358 The draft comment stated that
this requires the financier "to liquidate for the benefit of all creditors, and
prevents him from taking the cream off."'359 These initial proposals
would have reined in the power of the floating lienholder. Today such a
secured party can tie up all the debtor's assets and leave nothing for the
other creditors.360
Had this section been enacted, it would have changed the one-to-one
relationship between the inventory financier and the debtor into one in
which the financier would act for the benefit of all the creditors. It would
have subjected him to damages for unilateral, commercially unreasonable
acts done without other creditors' approval. But these early versions
were greeted by harsh criticism from the practicing bar, which thought
them to be unworkable and devoid of practical understanding of the ac-
tual financing. They would change into a statute that gives the secured
351. See Commercial Code Secured Credit Transactions, Article VI §§ 30, 37 (1948),
reprinted in 4 CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS, supra note 74, at 288 [hereinafter Commercial Code
Secured Credit Transactions].
352. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1989).
353. See id. § 9-206.
354. See FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Unfair or Deceptive
Acts or Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1995).
355. See Commercial Code Secured Credit Transactions, supra note 351, art. VI § 212.
356. See Commercial Code, Article VII § 316 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1948), reprinted in
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTs 435 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
357. Id. § 320.
358. See id.
359. Commercial Code, Article VII (Notes and Comments to Tentative Draft No. 2,
1948), reprinted in 5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 151 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed.,
1984).
360. See Barnes, supra note 13, at 150-51.
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party practically uncontrolled supremacy. 361
B. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY CLAUSE
The section that started out regulating standardized contracts finally
dropped its reference to such contracts in 1948 and emerged as the un-
conscionability section applying to all contracts. It now read as follows:
SECTION 23. UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR CLAUSE.
(1) If the court finds the contract to be unconscionable, it may
refuse to enforce the contract or strike any unconscionable clauses
and enforce the rest of the contract or substitute for the stricken
clause such provision as would be implied under this Act if the
stricken clause had never existed.
(2) A contract not unconscionable in its entirety but containing an
unconscionable clause, whether a form clause or not, may be en-
forced with any such clause stricken. 362
The introduction of "unconscionability" limited the regulatory power
of the courts to the more extreme cases, but the dropping of the form
contract limitation greatly expanded the scope of the clause. Moreover,
the proposed comment on section 23 referred to the court as having a
wide regulating power.363 This comment started by attempting to link
sales unconscionability to the doctrine in equity: "This section applies the
equity courts' ancient policy or [sic] policing contracts for unconscionabil-
ity or unreasonableness to the field of sales. '364 The standard of the com-
ment, however, differed from that of the traditional equitable doctrine.
Neither the term "shock the conscience" nor the concept of taking advan-
tage of a party's circumstances were mentioned. Instead, concepts such
as "unreasonableness," "contrary to the essential purpose of the agree-
ment," and the "true agreement" were used. The focus was (as it was in
the original section 1-C) on enforcing actual bargains, and rejecting cer-
tain language as not actually bargained for:
Action by the courts under this section may be viewed as a type of
reformation. Not the usual type of reformation in which a writing is
conformed to an antecedent and actual oral agreement but reforma-
tion by eliminating a term agreed upon which is so unconscionable or
so demonstrates overreaching that a true agreement on the term can-
not be assumed.365
361. See Letter from Irvin L. Livingston to William A. Bars, ALI Archives (June 25,
1948) (on file with SMU Law Review). "[T]he draft gives rather conclusive evidence that it
was formulated without adequate knowledge or understanding of practical and functional
operations of inventory financing and accounts receivable from either the borrower's or
the financier's standpoint." Id. "I do not think that any drafting staff could work [the]
article into reasonable decent shape in any short period of time." Letter from J. Francis
Ireton to Milton P. Kupfer, ALI Archives (June 4, 1948) (on file with SMU Law Review).
362. Code of Commercial Law, supra note 14, § 23.
363. See Uniform Revised Sales Act Proposed Comment on Section 23[2-9] (1948),
microformed on Karl N. Llewellyn Papers J.X.2.e. (on file with SMU Law Review) [herein-
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The test is still "unreasonable." "When a clause or set of clauses looks
unreasonable to a dispassionate court, then it is up to the clause-writing
party to show the court that the clause is not unreasonable in fact, either
in general or in the particular case. '366
Prior to the 1948 comment, Llewellyn had not dealt with the problem
of a party entering into a contract knowing that it had made a bad deal.
The section previously focused on unexpected language or provisions that
were deviant from trade norms found in a form contract. Now the situa-
tion that had to be addressed was when the party was aware that he was
agreeing to harsh terms:
The second type of situation arising in connection with uncon-
scionable contracts or clauses involves cases where one party has de-
liberately entered into a lopsided bargain with full knowledge and
awareness and has actually assented to clauses which are unconscion-
able in effect against him. Such cases are rare but they do occur
where one party has been willing to take a gambler's chance that the
clause will not be called into action against him or where economic
necessity or duress has driven him into the bargain. 367
Furthermore, even in those cases where one party has knowingly
agreed to the unconscionable clause, this Act moves on the theory
that sales contracts have as their legally necessary effect certain mini-
mum incidents set forth in this Act. The question primarily is
whether or not a contract for sale in a business sense was intended.
If so, then the transaction is governed by this Act and its minimum
legal effects are laid down by the law as embodied in this Act. Typi-
cal of such necessary effects are the necessity for reasonable notice of
termination under Section 33 [3-8] and the limitations on modifica-
tion of remedies under Sections 121 [8-19] and 122 [8-20]. Therefore,
even where one party has deliberately entered into an unreasonable
agreement, the court may, under this Section, refuse to enforce the
clause or agreement as unconscionable and declare that the provi-
sions of this Act be made operative instead.368
The proposed comment did not deal extensively with the problems
raised by form contracts that deviate from trade norms. It did, however,
refer to the General Comment, which treated the issues at length.369
Thus, the proposed unconscionability section was to be read in conjunc-
tion with the General Comment's emphasis on enforcement of trade
norms.
Today, we may see unconscionability as applying primarily to such cen-
tral items as price and warranty. Llewellyn's comments on the unconscio-
nability section, however, did not focus on these critical terms, but rather
on minor ones involved with trade practices. The examples he gave in the
Proposed Comment were "the necessity for reasonable notice of termina-
366. Id. at 6.
367. Id. at 3.
368. Id. at 6.
369. See id. at 3. "Standard Forms and Clauses are covered in the General Comment to
Part II, paragraph 7 on the principle of reasonable construction against surprise." Id.
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tion" and "the limitations on modifications of remedies. '370 Therefore,
the form contract/unconscionability section was directed at contractual
changes from the good merchant rules and provisions of the Sales Article.
It policed these changes when they unreasonably or unexpectedly varied
from the norms of merchant dealing.
X. THE 1949 DRAFTS
The 1949 drafts represent a definitive stage in the development of the
Code. The 1949 drafts are representative of the best work of the drafters
before public comment and lobbying took place. It was not until the 1949
drafts that commercial, business, and financial groups woke up and
started taking the Code project seriously.
How final the drafters regarded the 1949 version is unclear. The "Fore-
word" to the 1949 Draft states that "[i]t is obviously incomplete in many
respects, [but] .. .we thought it highly desirable to bring it out in the
form of a complete printed Code. In that form we can see what we have
done and what we still have left to do."' 371 The Chairman of the Division
of Mercantile Law of the American Bar Association, J. Francis Ireton,
stated that:
The sponsors of the Code had originally intended to approve it fi-
nally in September 1949, at their meeting in St. Louis, although in
the opinion of many the Code had not then reached the perfection it
should have had and outside of comparatively few people, no one
knew anything of it.372
In any case, in the words of Mr. Ireton, the Code was greeted with
protest:
The result was revision on revision to such an extent that you now
would never recognize the September 1949 draft of the Code in the
current draft. In the spring of 1950, a new draft was published and
distributed as the proposed final draft of text and comments to be
approved at Washington in May 1950. Committees of various Bar
Associations adopted resolutions requesting deferment of final ap-
proval for a period of two years until 1952 so as to give more people
time to study the proposal. Difficiencies [sic] were pointed out that
made the whole project suspect. 373
The 1949 Code thus best represents the intentions of the drafters.
What came after was a product of political compromise. In submitting
the proposed Code for adoption, the drafters were in an extremely bad
negotiating position. They were an exhausted army about to fight a big-
ger, better-supplied, and vastly more effective force. The drafters had
been working for approximately ten years and felt that they were at the
end of their energy and money. As stated by one of the drafters at a 1950
370. Id. at 6.
371. Uniform Commercial Code, Foreword (Draft, 1949).
372. J. Francis Ireton, The Commercial Code, 22 Miss. L.J. 273, 279 (1951).
373. Id.
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Joint ALI-NCC Committee meeting, "I boil it down to this: the question
is, are we going to have a Code or aren't we? We have run out of money.
We have spent ten years on the Sales Act. '374
The Chairman of the Committee, William A. Schnader, pointed out
that they were not merely restating the law, but preparing a statute.375 In
response to Professor Beutel's statement that "we ought to stand firm for
what we regard as fair, regardless of lobby pressure," he replied:
I was talking about certain regulatory bodies, regulating bodies that
are so powerful that if they say no to this Article it won't be passed.
That is what I am saying. We have to keep that in mind, because we
are not just working this Code for mental exercise; we want to see
something enacted. 376
One wonders if Llewellyn, along with his hand-picked group of young
professors (and his wife), was also psychologically vulnerable to business
pressure. Given Llewellyn's credo of hard-headed realism, he would be
especially sensitive to charges of ivory-towered impracticality. Professor
G. Edward White points out that the realists were committed to action,
real reform, and pragmatism:
In each of its major facets Realism was a jurisprudence congenial to
the America of the early 1930's. In the first years of the Great De-
pression, Americans found that one of the foundations of their soci-
ety, the superiority of a loosely regulated capitalist system and its
accompanying mythologies (the sanctity of private property, the vir-
tue of self-help) had crumbled, and they had to find some way to
rebuild in sounder form. In undertaking this task their environment
was one of economic deprivation; their mood, cynicism; their fantasy
heroes, hardboiled men of action; their academic tools, the behav-
ioral sciences; their philosophy of government, experimentalist and
pragmatic. The demythologizing tendencies of the Realists, their
commitment to decision-making by experiment, their preference for
empiricism rather than abstraction, even their questioning of moral
absolutes, were in harmony with the spirit of the first New Deal.377
Llewellyn displayed his own pragmatism and hard-headedness in an
unpublished essay headed: "I. Our present intellectualism is on the road
to annihilation and will reach its goal. II. This fact is rather pleasant than
otherwise. '378 In his essay, he characterizes intellectualism as a culture
built on a foundation of a life where:
You work, you produce, you pay, while I loaf, study, cultivate my-
self .... [The intellectual degenerates] your physique mentality turn
374. MILLER, supra note 233.
375. William A. Schnader was the President of the NCC, First Vice-President of the
ALl, and a "long time counsel for Banks." See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uni-form Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 362 n.171 (1952). See
generally TWINING, supra note 3, at 271, 279.
376. Consideration of Proposed Final Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, at 97,
ALl Archives (May 18, 1950) (on file with SMU Law Review).
377. Edward G. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criti-
cism and Social Change, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136, 139 (1978).
378. Llewellyn, unpublished manuscript, supra note 14.
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soft and gooey like a spotted apple .... [What is good thinking is
"Action directive" as opposed to "speculative or cultural."] .... Ac-
tion directive thinking is an orderly projection of the imagination into
the future, with strict adherence to the facts of experience. It is
checked up constantly, and therefore useful. It makes action pro-
duce more results and more enjoyment for self and others.379
Llewellyn's ethos, the same ethos that led him to volunteer for World
War I (for the German army!), would have made it impossible for him to
accept his proposed legislation as a mere academic discussion piece.
Although even more significant compromises lay in the future, the 1949
Code itself displayed significant changes from earlier drafts. The power
of merchants, merchant groups, and merchant norms were lessened.
Gone were the merchants juries, the mercantile standard of performance,
and many of the merchant rules. However, the Code still distinguished
between merchants and non-merchants. 380 In addition, good faith, de-
fined as observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards
of any business or trade in which he is engaged, 381 applied to the Code as
a whole.
Certain aspects of the draft survived the battle. For example, the stat-
ute's prescriptive sections, especially with regard to secured transactions
and the direct action against manufacturers, still existed. The 1949 Code,
especially in the Comments, provided for extensive court supervision
over the reasonableness of contracts. Although the form contract provi-
sion metamorphosized into the unconscionability section, the 1949 sec-
tion called for "policing contracts for unreasonableness. ' 382 Likewise,
the 1949 Code provided that "express terms shall control. '383 But the
interaction among express terms, the duty of good faith, and the provi-
sions of the Code are unclear. In sum, the General Comment-with its
strong empowerment of the courts to regulate commercial dealings in
light of merchant norms, fair dealing, and equal bargaining-had been
dropped, but some of its policies remained.
A. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE GENERAL COMMENT
The disappearance of the General Comment, sometime between
Spring of 1948 and the publication of the 1949 Drafts, was an unpub-
licized major change in the Code.384 The 1948 comment to the uncon-
scionability section, for example, referred to the General Comment.38 5
379. Id.
380. See U.C.C. § 2-104 (Draft, 1949).
381. See id. §§ 1-201(16), 1-203.
382. See id. § 2-302, cmt. 1.
383. See id. § 1-205(4)(b).
384. The General Comment is mentioned in the Proposed Comment on Section 23[2-9],
supra note 363. The General Comments are not in, nor are they mentioned in, The Uni-
form Commercial Code of 1948-49.
385. "The severe difficulties encountered by the courts in their efforts to effect this
reconciliation (between demands of commercial standards and good faith and leeways in
contracting) have been discussed at length in the General Comment on Part II." Id.
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The Official Drafts of 1949, however, did not include it. At the time, the
U.C.C. retained an explicit reference for use of the comments, lasting
until 1957.386 Since that time the extensive specific comments of the 1944
draft, as well as the General Comment have disappeared.
One reason for the disappearance of the comments was that Karl Llew-
ellyn, Soia Mentschikoff, and others had trouble finishing them. In 1945,
William Prosser wrote Llewellan complaining about drafting fifty com-
ments due on January 1, 1946. The comments had to conform to the Sec-
tions, but the Sections were continually being amended.387 He felt that
he was paying for Llewellyn's delay: "I have the feeling that I am being
penalized for your sins in not getting Comments done promptly once the
sections were set . "... ,388 The comment drafting process had become
uncontrollable. In 1948, Goodrich wrote Menschikoff that the Comments
had to get done or "you and I will be in our graves long before the Code
is completed. '389 Moreover, they were too long.390 In the summer of
1948, after coming back from an excellent vacation, Llewellyn and Ment-
schikoff agreed to cut the Comments down from one-half to two-thirds.
They decided that the entire collection of case material needed to be
discarded. 391
That material was to become the subject matter of a book entitled
Llewellyn and Mentschikoff on Sales. "Karl said he hoped he would get
386. "The Comments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted in its construction and application
of this Act but if text and comment conflict, text controls." NORDSTROM, supra note 106,
at 9. The Comment stated:
Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is the objective of this Code;
and that objective cannot be obtained without substantial uniformity of con-
struction. To aid in uniform construction, these Comments (which will have
been before the Congress or the Legislature at the time of the adoption of
this Act) set forth the purpose of various provisions of this Act, thus disclos-
ing the uniform-intent of the lawmaking bodies in enacting the Code. There-
fore, subsection (2) of the present section recommends these Comments to
the consideration of the courts to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the
Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction by mis-
take of legislative intention.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) cmt. 3 (Draft, May 1949).
387. If past experience is any criterion, you and Soia will tear up a least half of
the sections in December, and I shall be making the forlorn and desperate
attempt to work nights to revise both Sections and Comments and get them
ready and mimeographed by January 1. Obviously it can't be done, and I am
not going to get it done, and I shall have to get it done, and I shall have to
turn in a report as to why not, with some burning words amounting to in-
struction, selection and not in the public streets.
Letter from William Prosser to Professor Karl N. Llewellyn (Nov. 17, 1945) (on file with
SMU Law Review).
388. Id. at 2.
389. Letter from Herbert F. Goodrich to Soia Mentschikoff, ALI Archives (Feb. 2,
1948) (on file with SMU Law Review).
390. "It was ultimately realized that these Comments were so very voluminous that
very few lawyers, other than an occasional law school professor, would have the time or
patience to read them." Letter from Hiram Thomas to Benjamin Wham, ALl Archives
(Dec. 2, 1948) (on file with SMU Law Review).
391. See Letter from Herbert F. Goodrich to Howard Barkdull et al., ALl Archives
(July 13, 1948) (on file with SMU Law Review).
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the book written and it would have with the Revised Sales Act something
comparable with the influence which Williston's had upon the original
Act."'392 Llewellyn and his wife, however, never did write their treatise.
In an earlier article, Between-The-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewel-
lyn, Legal Realism, and The Uniform Commercial Code in Context,3 93 I
argued that we ignore the thirties' ideology that informed Llewellyn's
thinking because of the social and intellectual changes wrought by World
War II, and because of the post-war bias against collectivist thinking.
394
Another reason is just that most of Llewellyn's explanations were edited
out of the Code, and he never wrote the treatise that would have ex-
plained his Code.
The most important effect of the disappearance of the General Com-
ment was the disappearance of Llewellyn's peculiar approach to contract
formation. His was not the only possible interpretation of the Code lan-
guage, but it was a definite one from one of its principal drafters. With-
out it, commentators were left to speculate on such issues as the meaning
of unconscionability, the interaction between freedom of contract, and
the obligation to follow reasonable commercial standards in the trade.
The General Comment had proposed two objective indices for contract
interpretation, the nature of the bargaining process and the Code provi-
sions. Now the courts would have only the vague, subjective guides of
good faith and unconscionability. Some commentators, such as David
Melinkoff, would merely conclude that the Code's language is impossibly
vague.395 But the General Comment clarified that terms such as "com-
mercially reasonable" had an objective meaning-that contracting pro-
cess and results were to be looked at in the light of accepted trade norms,
equal bargaining, and the Code provisions. The General Comment's de-
mise unmoored the U.C.C. from its connection to Llewellyn's anthropo-
logical vision of basing sales law on merchant practices.
B. THE FOUR PARAMETERS
Looking at the 1949 Code in light of our four parameters, we see that
emphasis on merchant norms continued with good faith defined as the
"reasonable commercial standards" of any business or trade, applicable
to the entire Code. 396 Reasonable commercial practices would also con-
trol contractual limitations of remedies: "[G]ood faith requires that such
an allocation [limitation or exclusion of consequential damages] shall not
exclude risks which could have been avoided by decent commercial prac-
tice, good faith, and reasonable care. '397
392. Id.
393. See Kamp, supra note 40, at 325.
394. See id. at 390-96.
395. See generally David Mellinkoff, The Language of The Uniform Commercial Code,
77 YALE L.J. 185 (1967).
396. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 16 (Draft, 1949).
397. Id. § 2-721 cmt. 3.
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The definition of "good faith" in Article III is confusing. The defini-
tion of holder in due course requires "good faith;" and a comment to the
section on notice states that "good faith" is subjective while notice in-
volves a "community rather than an individual standard. ' 398 Article I,
however, made objective good faith applicable to the entire Code.399
Article I made clear that the Code treats contract formation and per-
formance as an on-going, cooperative process: "This Act adopts the prin-
ciples of those cases which see a commercial contract not as an 'arm's-
length' adversary venture, but as a venture of material interest, when suc-
cessful, and as involving due regard for commercial decencies when the
expected favorable outcome fails. ''4°°
Thus, the Code lost the emphasis of the General Comment on trade
norms as the basis of the Code's contract law. When the General Com-
ment was deleted, the meaning of unconscionability was changed from its
prior focus on trade norms and equal bargaining power to a rule embody-
ing equity practice. In fact, the 1949 Draft was the only one that explicitly
referenced the equity tradition of unconscionability.40 The reference of
the unconscionability section's comment to "unconscionability or unrea-
sonableness" and to the "discretion" of the court 402 took the meaning of
the section away from its roots in merchants' norms and changed the sec-
tion into a grant of authority to the court to police bargains on a subjec-
tive basis.
In some ways, the 1948-49 Code increased the power of the court to
regulate commercial dealings. Certainly the expansion of the scope of
the unconscionability clause from form contracts to all contracts and its
grant of discretion increased the power of the judge over commercial
deals. Under the definition of "good faith," the judge was given power to
police commercial practices: "Reasonable commercial standards does
not mean the lax standards sometimes permitted to grow up but is in-
tended to permit the court to inquire as to whether a particular commer-
cial standard is in fact reasonable. '403
1. Sales
As to specific legislative directions, important prescriptive sections are
contained in the secured transactions and the sales articles. The 1949 Act
dropped the General Comment's use of Article 2's sections as an index to
regulate the interpretation and fairness of contracts. However, a com-
ment to section 2-302 required certain "minimum incidents" of a sales
contract, which "are laid down by the law as embodied in this Article. '40 4
398. Id. § 3-304 cmt. 2.
399. See id. § 1-203 (emphasis added).
400. Id. § 1-203 cmt. 1.
401. "This section is intended to apply to the field of Sales the equity courts' ancient
policy of policing contracts for unconscionability or unreasonableness." Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
402. Id.
403. Id. § 1-201 cmt. 16.
404. Id. § 2-302 cmt. 4.
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Another common type of situation arising in connection with uncon-
scionable contracts or clauses consists of cases where one party has
deliberately entered into a lopsided bargain with full knowledge and
awareness and has actually assented to clauses which are unconscion-
able in effect against him. In such cases this Article goes on the the-
ory that sales contracts have as their legally necessary effect certain
minimum incidents set forth in this Article despite any agreement of
the parties to the contrary. The question primarily is whether or not
a contract for sale in a business sense was intended. If so, then the
transaction is governed by this Article and its minimum legal effects
are laid down by the law as embodied in this Article. Therefore, the
court may, under this section, refuse to enforce the clause or agree-
ment as unconscionable and declare that the provisions of this Arti-
cle be made operative instead.40 5
Article 2 still included the direct action against manufacturers. This pro-
posal would elicit vigorous lobbying in opposition.
2. Secured Transactions
It was the article on secured transactions, then Article 7, which most
limited freedom of contract.406 In the words of J. Francis Ireton, the
Chairman of the Division of Mercantile Law of the American Bar Associ-
ation, "this can be said about the Article, that of all the Articles in the
Code this Article had a more definite and decided slant to the left than
any of the other Articles in the Code. '40 7
Prior to the March 1949 meeting, the secured transactions drafters
questioned the primacy of the inventory financier. They noted, "[a]s now
drafted, a financing institution can so get a lien on the inventory of a
business as to claim all the assets ahead of other creditors. '40 8 It was fair
to protect secured lenders against other lending institutions, but "laborers
and small merchandise and service creditors" may also need some protec-
tion.409 The drafters proposed a resolution that some creditors be al-
lowed to reach a certain percentage of inventory. Moreover, they
questioned whether it was "good policy to permit inventory liens on the
inventory of retail establishments. ' 410 They proposed that "bulk mort-
gages" on retailers be permitted only if the proceeds of the loan were put
into the business.411
The Revision of Tentative Draft No. 2 (February 3, 1949) retained the
405. Id.
406. See U.C.C. art. 7 (Revision of Tentative Draft No. 2, 1949).
407. Ireton, supra note 372, at 281-82.
408. Preliminary Questions of Policy for Consideration in Connection with Article VII,
at 1, ALI Archives (on file with SMU Law Review). The document's reference to Article
VII and to "the March meeting" probably places it in early 1949.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 2.
411. See id. at 3.
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prohibition against disclaiming warranties by the security agreement.412
Tentative Draft Number 3 (March 1, 1949) limited the self-help reposses-
sion where the consumer paid more than a certain percentage of the obli-
gation.413 Section 7-106(2) prevented a security agreement from limiting
or disclaiming express or implied sales warranties, and section 7-106(3)
stated that a merchant could always assert claims amounting to a failure
of consideration against an assignee. For non-merchant debtors, "a suc-
cessor in interest of a financier takes subject to any defenses which the
borrower has against the original financier. ' 414 A holder in due course of
a note secured by a consumer's goods had the option of claiming on the
note or as an assignee. If claiming on the note as a holder-in-due course,
the security interest would lapse; if claiming as an assignee, he could not
be a holder-in-due course. 415 This limitation on holders in due course in
consumer transactions was twenty-eight years ahead of its time; the Fed-
eral Trade Commission finally prohibited the holder in due course status
in consumer transactions in 1977.416
By May of 1949, section 7-605 protected the consumer by requiring
twenty days notice before repossession if the consumer had paid more
than sixty percent of the obligation secured. 417 Section 7-611 was also
nineteen years ahead of its time in providing for such credit disclosures as
the cash price, the credit service charge, and the amount of each payment
before the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968.418
In the area of inventory financing, the 1949 Code dropped many of its
protections for non-inventory financiers and other creditors. Section 7-
323(9), however, provided that the debtor and any other secured creditor
could sue the inventory financier for damages for failure to follow the
prescribed default procedures. The section provided a safe harbor by
having the financier's actions approved by a court or creditor's committee
and, thus, being immunized from suit.4 19
Speaking of the prior draft's procedures, Mr. Ireton declared them to
be unworkable:
The other kind of inventory lien that could be taken was a lien on a
conglomerate mass, such as a pile of coal or cotton seeds in a ware-
house; this was a general lien and on default the lender was under
the obligation of giving all creditors notice, calling them in, securing
412. See Secured Commercial Transactions, Revision of Tentative Draft No. 2, Article
VII § 7-106, reprinted in 5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 167 (Elizabeth S. Kelly
ed., 1984).
413. See Tentative Draft No. 3, Article VII § 7-611 (1949), reprinted in 5 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 222 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984).
414. Id. § 7-108(2)-(3).
415. See id. § 7-612.
416. See Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1997).
417. See U.C.C. § 7-605(1)(b) (Draft 1949).
418. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994). Generally, one could say that the early con-
sumer protection sections of the Code, which were rejected in the fifties, reappeared as
federal legislation in the sixties and seventies. Manufacturers direct liability re-emerged as
§ 402A liability. See Clutterbuck, supra note 96.
419. See U.C.C. § 7-323(8) (Draft, 1949).
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the borrower's consent, then proceeding with liquidation of the lien
with the obligation of a trustee. You can imagine what these provi-
sions would have done. There just would be no inventory financing.
Small business would suffer irreparable harm.420
Thus, as of May 1949, the Code still proposed some radical changes
with intrusive judicial and legislative regulation of commercial law:
courts could police unreasonable contracts and limitations of remedies;
trade norms were to be the basis of good faith throughout the Code; se-
cured financing was to be regulated; 421 and the provision for a proto-
402A liability still existed.
3. The Later 1949 Drafts
By September 1949, another revision to the secured transactions article
provided that a judicial lien could attach to a borrower's interest "but
judicial sale of the collateral may not be had until ten days after notice of
the sale has been given to the secured lender. 422
The October 1949 Drafts made few changes. They dropped the section
enabling a judicial lien holder to sell the collateral. The secured transac-
tions article, then Article 8, provided that in the case of purchase money
security interests in consumer goods, an assignee takes subject to all of
the consumer's defenses. In a broadening of protection from the prior
version, a negotiable note that was part of such a transaction would also
be subject to all defenses.42 3 The secured lender's ability to repossess,
however, was strengthened by not requiring twenty days notice to repos-
420. Ireton, supra note 372, at 282.
421. See GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note 19, § 9.2, at 293 nn.8-9. Grant
Gilmore described the consumer protection section of the May 1949 secured transaction
article as follows:
In the May, 1949, Draft, Part 6 on Consumer Goods Financing contained
provisions which invalidated an after-acquired property interest which at-
tached more than ten days after the consumer had agreed to give a lien;
allowed good faith purchasers of the collateral (other than secondhand deal-
ers) to take free of the lien despite filing; regulated the rights of both parties
on default; discharged the consumer from his obligation to the extent of any
insurance proceeds received by the "financer" (secured party); regulated the
form of contract to be used, requiring an itemized disclosure of the elements
making up the time price and making the lien unenforceable against the con-
sumer unless he received a signed copy of the contract which, in addition to
the price disclosure items, "conspicuously indicates" that the contract gave
the "financer" the right to repossess on default; subjected a holder in due
course of a consumer's note to contract defenses if the holder asserted rights
against the collateral; regulated, in the consumer's interest, such devices as
the "lay-away plan" and the "add-on contract."
Of the May, 1949, provisions referred to [above], there survived in the
final draft the limitation on effectiveness of the after-acquired property
clause in consumer goods (§9-204(4), .... ) and vestigial traces of the provi-
sions which had allowed certain good faith purchasers to take free of the
security interest even though perfected (§9-307(2),...) ... and subjected
holders in due course to contract defenses (§9-206(1) ...
Id.
422. U.C.C. § 8-305 (Draft, 1949).
423. See id. § 8-207(3).
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sess "where the secured lender has reasonable grounds to believe that the
collateral will be destroyed, damaged or lost before judicial proceedings
can be instituted. 42 4
By October of 1949, the floating lienholders primacy had been estab-
lished. It is ironic that the initial proposals that attempted to empower
the local merchant had been transformed into an act that empowered
financers.
The Bank Collections part of Article 3 was changed to provide for
modifications of the statutory provisions by agreement. Agreements
were not to be effective, however, to limit bank liability to a customer for
collection, to extend time limits, or to limit liability for improper han-
dling.42 5 What was "a varying agreement" was left to contract law. Un-
like present law, language in deposit slips and the like might not bind the
customer.42 6 Today, "agreements" in banking include rules of which the
customer may not be aware, 427 such as legends on deposit tickets and the
like.42
8
The question of variation of the Code's provisions by agreement was to
become paramount in the subsequent debate. The question was not set-
tled until after the New York Law Revision Commission did its work, and
the 1957 Code was prepared in response. The solution provided by the
October 1949 Draft version of Article 3 was to be generally adopted in
1957, with the Article's provisions made generally variable by agreement;
but certain duties were not disclaimable.429
424. Id. § 8-503(2).
425. See id. § 3-601.
426. See id. "Cases holding stipulations in passbooks, deposit slips and signature cards
not binding against the depositor because not called to his attention are not overruled by
the Code." Id. § 3-601 cmt. 2.
427. "Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters, clearing house rules, and the
like, have the effect of agreements under subsection (1), whether or not specifically as-
sented to by all parties interested in items handled." U.C.C. § 4-103(2) (1991).
428. As here used "agreement" has the meaning given to it by Section 1-201(3).
The agreement may be direct, as between the owner and the depositary
bank; or indirect, as where the owner authorizes a particular type of proce-
dure and any bank in the collection chain acts pursuant to such authoriza-
tion. It may be with respect to a single item; or to all items handled for a
particular customer, e.g., a general agreement between the depository bank
and the customer at the time a deposit account is opened. Legends on de-
posit tickets, collection letters and acknowledgments of items, coupled with
action by the affected party constituting acceptance, adoption, ratification,
estoppel, or the like, are agreements if they meet the tests of the definition of
"agreement."
See id. § 4-103 cmt. 2.
429. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1957).
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be dis-
claimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the stan-
dards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
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C. THE CODE GOES DOWNTOWN
Getting back to our opening metaphor, we now can picture the Code
drafters in 1949 getting in their taxis and going downtown to present their
creation to the commercial world. The drafting process had started in the
Great Depression; now the nation was embarked on a great post-war rise
in wealth and power. First drafted as a cure for the Depression, the 1949
Code was introduced to the greatest economy the world had ever seen.
The stakes had become much larger.
The drafters were not naive about the downtown world, but they were
hopeful that the excellence, rationality, and usefulness of their statute
would result in its acceptance. They were too hopeful. Professor Rubin
describes a later process of commercial lawmaking, the process of draft-
ing and enacting the revision to Articles 3 and 4, which resembled what
would happen to the proposed Code. The process was captured by bank
attorneys, who saw the issues from the perspective of their clients. Their
influence outweighed that of the only group with a consumer perspective,
the few law professors who were involved. Few legislators were inter-
ested in these arcane issues. The end result was a pro-bank statute.430
In fact, the commercial world did not welcome the proposed Code.
Rather, the May and September 1949 Drafts elicited such protest as to
force revision on revision: "At that time several affected industries came
out with strong pleas against it and publicized their position all over the
country. The result was revision on revision to such an extent that you
now would never recognize the September 1949 draft of the Code in the
current draft."'431 In response to criticisms and comments, the submission
of the Code to the legislators was postponed until at least 1952.432
On the eve of the Code's presentation in 1949, Llewellyn was true to
his institutionalist vision. In a contemporary law review article, Law and
the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology,4 3 3 he conceptualized law as an
"institution," which was an "organized activity, activity organized around
430. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist:
Some Notes on the Process of Revising U. C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 743
(1993).
431. Irenton, supra note 372, at 279.
432. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 286-87.
After the publication of the first complete draft in May 1949, comments were
invited from a wide variety of sources and a number of organizations were
encouraged to undertake special studies of the Code. Between 1949 and
1952 memoranda and reports were received from Bar Associations, law
firms, official committees set up in various states, and commercial and busi-
ness concerns such as the Association of American Railroads (1950), The
American Bankers' Association (1951), the National Canners Association
(1951), and the American Warehousemen's Association (1951). Literally
thousands of suggestions were received from every part of the country. Af-
ter requests from the ABA and others that they should be allowed more time
to study the Code, it was agreed to postpone submission to the Legislatures
until at least 1952.
Id.
433. Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 1286 (1949).
[Vol. 51
HISTORY OF THE U.C.C.
the cleaning up of some job. '434 He would have seen his statute's pur-
pose, then, as helping groups of merchants go about their business of buy-
ing and selling, rather than as facilitating individual bargaining.
Around this time, however, Llewellyn withdrew more and more from
the drafting process. Although continuing to serve as Chief Reporter, he
turned more to issues of jurisprudence, and his wife Soia Mentschikoff
took over more of the work.435 It may be that Llewellyn just did not want
to participate in the trench warfare of legislating under lobbyist pressures.
The political process of promulgating legislation consists largely of hag-
gling over minor changes in wording that can have significant effects. In-
terested parties seek language that will favor them or create loopholes to
protect their special interests. Nowhere in Llewellyn's writings can one
find an interest in this type of legislative detail. He was a big picture man;
it would be left to others to shepherd the Code through the political
process.436
In 1951, Grant Gilmore attempted to foresee the future enactment pro-
cess. He believed the financing institutions should support the enactment
of the secured transactions article. The proposed article offered much to
financiers, but it was at the price of granting protections for consumers
and other creditors such as the following:
No one should expect something for nothing, and the lenders are
being asked to pay a price. The price is stated in the imposition of
duties of care on the part of the lender which cannot be contracted
out of; in the incorporation of provisions designed to protect the bor-
rower and his other creditors from the undesirable effects of permit-
ting one lender to achieve a monopoly position by tying up all of a
debtor's assets; in the requirement of public filing for all non-posses-
sory security interests; and in casting on the lender certain business
risks, which arise from the chosen debtor's fraudulent activity. 437
Gilmore's experience, however, warned him that groups may not be so
reasonable: "In dealing with special interest groups over the past few
years I have, however, at times found it difficult to escape the impression
that what was being demanded was a free statutory subsidy ....438 He
accurately predicted that secured transactions were of concern only to
those business interests directly affected.
By its nature Article 9 cannot become a matter of any great public
interest-although there is a certain amount of fun in imagining the
Governor of Connecticut or of North Carolina running for re-elec-
434. Id. at 1289.
435. See TWINING, supra note 3, at 286.
436. My conclusion as to Llewellyn's disinterest in the minutiae of drafting is contra-
dicted by Grant Gilmore, who writes: "He was a remarkable draftsman and took a never-
failing interest in even the minutiae of the trade." Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl
Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962). In any case, Llewellyn did withdraw from the
drafting process, starting in 1949, and never displays in his writings the type of micro-
analysis of statutory drafting done by such scholars as White and Sumners.
437. Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW




tion on the issues of the after-acquired property clause and the float-
ing charge. It is a technical statute for specialists. Unfortunately all
the specialists are on the same team and there is no opposition.439
The actual enactment of the secured transactions article depended on
the wisdom of the finance industry. "To the extent that the passage or
defeat of legislation depends on rational grounds, Article 9 will pass or
fail depending on the attitude to be taken by the representatives of the
financing industry. May their choice be wise."' 440 The proposed Code, as
well, would depend on the wisdom of the commercial world.
439. Id. at 48.
440. Id.
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